

ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

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HOBBS'S CONCEPT OF THE EGOISTIC STATE OF NATURE EXTENDED
TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS AN EXPLANATORY MODEL FOR
ANALYZING THE MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE
SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS

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This study examines the motivations of the terrorist organization al Qaeda in facilitating the September 11 terrorist attacks involving the hijacking of four commercial jets and the subsequent crashing of two of these aircraft into the World Trade Center in New York, one into the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and a fourth into an abandoned field.

This study was based on the premise that extending Hobbes's concept of the egoistic state of nature to the conditions prevalent in international relations lends itself to an explanatory analysis of what motivated al Qaeda to facilitate the September 11 terrorist attacks.

A descriptive analysis of the applicable aspects of Hobbes's political philosophy was performed for the purpose of establishing a conceptual relationship between Hobbes's notion of the egoistic state of nature and the violent conditions that exist in global affairs that lead to political violence like the September 11 terrorist attacks.

The conclusions drawn from the findings suggest that there is a conceptual relationship between Hobbes's concept of the egoistic state of nature extended to international relations and the motivations that led al Qaeda to facilitate the September 11 attacks. Secondly, if steps are not taken to lessen the Hobbesian state of nature conditions prevalent in international affairs, then terrorist acts like the September 11 attacks will continue in the future.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The post-World War II period has yielded numerous theoretical studies regarding the nature, characterization, and causes of violent conflict in international relations.¹ International relations' phenomena referred to as transnational terrorism (political violence carried out by non-state actors) has prominently emerged as a major area of study in academic circles.² Transnational terrorism, though considerably different from global political violence facilitated by states, still represents political violence being facilitated in the global political arena.³ Based on this premise, the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and on the Pentagon represent political acts designed to accomplish political goals and objectives. Conceptualizing such acts of violence as inherently political allow for a systematic framework to analyze the causes of these attacks. According to translations of transcripts of a video tape Osama bin Laden

¹ Gleen Palmer, "Game Theory: Cooperation and Conflict" in *Peace: Meanings, Politics, Strategies*, ed. Linda Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1989), 179.

² Kent Layne Oots, *A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 3-12.

³ Bard O'Neill, "Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis," in *Insurgency in the Modern World*, ed. Bard O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts (Boulder, CO, 1980), 4.

(the self-proclaimed leader of al Qaeda) admits that operatives associated with and/or financed by al Qaeda were the transnational organization that facilitated the September 11 attacks that left over 3,000 people dead.⁴ Additionally, bin Laden has called for a jihad or holy war) against the United States, and the September 11 attacks represent the most devastating element (to date) of this holy war.⁵

Statement of Research Question

The central research problem that this study examines is reflected in the central research question: What is one theoretical framework that can be used to explain why al Qaeda would facilitate political violence in the form of the September 11 terrorist attacks? Accordingly, this study hypothesizes the following: By employing the inferences drawn from Hobbes's principals of the egoistic state of nature⁶ and the anarchical conditions prevalent in global relations (the international state of nature), and

⁴ "Transcript of Usama bin Laden Video Tape," trans. George Michael and Kassem M. Wahba [resource on-line] (Washington D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 13 December 2001, accessed 23 February 2003); available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-video.html>; Internet.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: Or, The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common Wealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil*, ed. Alfred Rayney Waller (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1904), 81-84. This reprint of *Leviathan* (as well as other scholarly sources that are used in this study) represent *digitized* versions of the original, verbatim content of these sources and are used for the purpose of ensuring the most accurate interpretation of these sources. Specifically, the reprint of *Leviathan* that is used in this study represents the 1651 original printing (see editors "Note," v-vi in this print of *Leviathan*) of Hobbes's work and contains some typographical, punctuation, and spelling errors that have been retained in the direct quotes (from Hobbes's writings) used in this study.

then extending these inferences to the egoistic motivations of al Qaeda (a political organization acting out in the anarchical conditions prevalent in global affairs), a strong relationship between these variables and the causes of the September 11 terrorist attacks may be formulated. Subsequently, the independent variable is Hobbes's conception of egoism extended to the international state of nature. The dependent variable is represented by the September 11 terrorist attacks. The main goal of this study is to determine the relationship between these variables.

Theoretical Framework

This study is specifically concerned with Hobbes's conception of the egoistic state of nature applied to the anarchical conditions prevalent in global affairs as a theoretical approach for explaining the causes of the September 11 attacks. Correspondingly, Hobbes's egoistic theory of human nature, in terms of the pursuit of self-interest, self-preservation, and power and glorification, provides an explanation for the existence of an anarchical state of nature.⁷ Hobbes posits that human nature is egoistic (consisting of self-interested behavior) and, as a result, individuals by nature are competitive, power hungry beings set on the pursuit of self-conservation and pleasure.⁸ This "natural condition" leads to a state of nature in which everyone unabashedly pursues these natural tendencies by any means he or she deems necessary.⁹ Hobbes's theory of the state of

⁷ Ibid, 83.

⁸ Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), 122-124.

⁹ Ibid.

nature is based on the assumption that individuals possess a natural desire to express egoistic tendencies in the absence of sovereign political authority.¹⁰ For Hobbes, the morality and constraint of individuals who possess these desires come only as a result of forming a social contract.¹¹ Extending Hobbes's conceptualization of the state of nature to international relations yields the following supposition: If there is not a fully encompassing, binding contract among political actors acting out in the global political arena, then there are no constraining principles that inhibit the behavior of these actors.

The above-stated ideas provide the rationale for the adoption and application of the Hobbesian theoretical framework to this study. The September 11 attacks represent global terrorism, and, within the context of global relations, a type of Hobbesian state of nature (the international state of nature) exists in the absence of a binding social contract between political actors in the global political arena and an international sovereign capable of managing the anarchical conditions prevalent in international affairs.¹² Consequently, political actors engage in struggles similar to the struggles that would exist in the Hobbesian state of nature. Under the conditions of the Hobbesian state of nature every political actor has the "right" to express its natural egoistic behaviors in any manner it deems necessary. Moreover, the fact that Hobbes believes that human nature is egoistic

¹⁰ T. E. Jessop, *Thomas Hobbes* (London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1960), 18.

¹¹ Richard Tuck, *Hobbes* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1989), 68-70.

¹² G. M. Tamás, "Beyond the Nation State," *Social Research* 63, no. 1 (1996): 191.

also partly explains why political actors (both human, state-based, and transnational-oriented) would resort to the type of political violence defined as terrorism. This study will show that all human political actors exhibit the same natural egoistic tendencies, and these tendencies express themselves in the political actions of these actors. As a result, groups, like al Qaeda, may consider themselves to be relatively free from any moral constraints as they carry out violent political acts. The only constraints on political actors are the limitations of access to material resources and manpower.

Non-state, transnational terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, exist and operate in a relatively subordinate power position within the international political order and compete with the overwhelming force and power of nation-states such as the United States, its allies, and its client states. United States' client states are defined for the purposes of this study as states directly influenced or to a significant degree controlled by the United States. Some examples of allies and client states of the United States that are relevant to the concerns of this study are the sovereigns of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Pakistan, and Israel. Based on the fact that al Qaeda is a subordinate political actor (in the sense that it has relatively less capabilities than the United States), the organization resorts to political extremism in the form of terrorism to compete against the dominant power of the United States.¹³ Within the spectrum of its desire to compete for political power, al Qaeda responds to the dominant power and influence of the United States by expressing its own relative power capabilities¹⁴ through terrorist attacks. It is conceivable, therefore,

¹³ Richard K. Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (2002):19-21.

¹⁴ Claes G. Ryn, "Dimensions of Power: The Transformation of Liberalism and the Limits of 'Politics'," *Humanitas* 13, no. 2 (2000): 4.

that al Qaeda views the current international political system as one consisting of a hegemonic hierarchy controlled by the U.S. that ultimately makes many Muslims' lives worse and less secure.

Critical Assumptions Based on Hobbes's Theoretical Formulations

A crucial question, when applying Hobbes's perspective to the goals of al Qaeda, then, is whether an intensification of the state of nature in the global political arena (wherein political actors can do whatever their capacity for the exercise of power allows, including the use of political violence) is preferable to the current global realities that include the U.S. as the premier hegemonic power in world affairs? Consequently, in providing an answer to this inquiry, consideration must be given to the following set of assumptions derived from Hobbes's theory:

- (1) The expression of Hobbesian egoistic tendencies by human political actors in international affairs leads to an international state of nature;
- (2) In the absence of sovereign political authority, Hobbes's conception of a state of nature, when extended to international relations and exacerbated by the expression of the stated egoistic tendencies, leads to anarchical conditions in the global political arena;
- (3) In an international state of nature, political actors may pursue their egoistic tendencies without constraint and in any manner they deem necessary;
- (4) The members of Al Qaeda, as human political actors, facilitate terrorist actions within the anarchical conditions of the Hobbesian international state of nature.

Al Qaeda's Goals and Strategies

Given the above assumption or formulations, it is unnecessary to show that al Qaeda's leaders believe that their goals are Hobbesian in nature, only that their goals reflect some aspects of Hobbes's egoistic state of nature. This minimal necessity lends

itself to a brief description of the stated goals and objectives of Al Qaeda. According to

John Pike:

Al-Qa'ida is multi-national, with members from numerous countries and with a worldwide presence. Senior leaders in the organization are also senior leaders in other terrorist organizations, including those designated by the Department of State as foreign terrorist organizations, such as the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian al-Jihad. Al Qaeda seeks a global radicalization of existing Islamic groups and the creation of radical Islamic groups where none exist [*sic*].

Al Qa'ida supports Muslim fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Kosovo. It also trains members of terrorist organizations from such diverse countries as the Philippines, Algeria, and Eritrea.

Al-Qa'ida da's goal is to 'unite all Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs.' Bin Laden has stated that the only way to establish the Caliphate is by force. Al Qaeda's goal, therefore, is to overthrow nearly all Muslim governments, which are viewed as corrupt, to drive Western influence from those countries, and eventually to abolish state boundaries

[The organization] issued statements [*sic*] under banner of 'the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders' in February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens-[*sic*] civilian or military--and their allies everywhere¹⁵

Pikes' descriptions of al Qaeda are particularly informative because they are derived from direct quotes from the al Qaeda leadership.

Dependence on "In Trust" Relations

One element that contributes to the achievement of the above-stated goals of al Qaeda is the ability of the organization to garner financial resources. According to investigative reporter Adam Cohen, al Qaeda solicits donations from like-minded supporters and siphons funds from Muslim charitable organizations to finance its

¹⁵ John Pike, "al-Qa'ida (The Base)," [on-line database] (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, accessed 30 April 2003); available from <http://www.fas.org/irp.world/para/ladin.htm>; Internet.

activities.¹⁶ As the organization evolved from a national organization in Afghanistan to a multi-national network operating globally, it used the concept of Hawala to secretly facilitate its goals.¹⁷ Hawala loosely translates in Arabic to “in trust,” but generally refers to a bond of trust between transacting individuals, and has historically been used to refer to a special informal way of carrying out business transactions and relaying information in Central Asian cultures.¹⁸ This informal mechanism (in some, but not all instances), is noted for not leaving a “paper trail” and illustrates an unique Arab approach to business.¹⁹ It is believed that Hawala is used by al Qaeda to secretly transfer money and to make global financial transactions.²⁰

Violence as a Play to the Media

Hawala and similar methods reflect social norms and practices that have existed within Arab and Muslim cultures for centuries. Unfortunately, some Americans are not aware of the diversity and complexity of Arab and Muslim culture and may tend to stereotype all Arab Muslims as anti-American terrorists. Much of what American citizens learn about the world is package by mainstream media television outlets through visual

¹⁶ Adam Cohen, “How bin Laden Funds His Network,” *Time*, 1 October 2001, 63.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

imagery that oversimplifies and misrepresents reality.²¹ It could reasonably be argued that after September 11 some elements within the American mainstream television media framed their coverage within a perspective that views U.S. policy as always representing that which is “good” and “moral,” and Islamic culture as representing that which is “bad” and “evil.” The American mainstream television media have tremendous sway in shaping American public opinion.²² Consequently, as suggested by Doris Graber, the limited worldview of Americans evolves from the oversimplified images presented by the media.²³

The role played by the media is critical to the dramatization of terrorist attacks, because the media unwittingly serves the interests of the terrorists by emphasizing the violent nature of the attacks through its continual coverage. Therefore, terrorists tend to attempt to carry out attacks that will provide the media with the most dramatic and violent events to present to their audience. Through this process the media inject the acts with even more fear and intimidation.

A noticeable degree of the American mainstream media coverage of September 11 focused on the responses of the George W. Bush Administration to the attacks. These responses concentrate on the need for preemptive military attacks, such as the Iraq War, and technologically-based U.S. military superiority as a mechanism for countering and

²¹ Doris A. Graber, “Seeing is Remembering: How Visuals Contribute to Learning from Television News,” *Journal of Communication* 40, no. 3 (1990): 134.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

limiting terrorist attacks.²⁴ This approach is taken as opposed to developing a response to terrorism that reflects a more practical national security policy. The Bush Administration's response is, however, applicable to the Hobbesian approach in the sense that in Hobbes's view it is human nature to engage in violence with perceived competitors.²⁵ More specifically, violence provides a mechanism that allows for the ability of more powerful individuals to "make themselves masters of other men's wives, children and [property]"²⁶ Applying this Hobbesian concept to the concerns of this study reflects why some political actors would resort to political violence to achieve their self-interested goals.²⁷

The Relative Application of the Term "Terrorism"

It is the pursuit of self-interested goals that lead actors to apply relativism to their consideration of the morality of the use of political violence. For example, the relative application of the definitions of who are terrorists and what constitutes a terrorist act is illustrated by John Exposito who points out that, "often the answer depends upon where one stands."²⁸ Exposito further states that political actors who challenge the authority of

²⁴ Jerry Harris, "Dreams of Global Hegemony and the Technology of War," *Race and Class* 45, no. 2 (2003): 54-56.

²⁵ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 83-84.

²⁶ Ibid, 83.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ John Exposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 280.

more dominant nation-states “are often portrayed as extremists.”²⁹ According to Exposito, this characterization of certain actors as “extremists” leads to the labeling of their violent political actions by some as terrorism.³⁰

The relative meanings of what constitutes terrorist attacks are reflected in the subjective characterization of violent actions by the George W. Bush Administration since the September 11 attacks.³¹ This assertion is made because when the U.S., its allies, or its client states engage in political violence, it is not generally characterized as “terrorism” by the U.S. government or the American mainstream media. For instance, in 1946, the U.S. government opened the School of the Americas, and through this apparatus the U.S. taught over 60,000 individuals from other countries how to effectively terrorize their populations in support of U.S. interests.³² Reportedly, many of the individuals that attended this school were taught how to “make war on their own people.”³³ The School of the Americas indirectly represented the expression of state-

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Sam Gardiner, “Summary of a Study of Strategic Influence, Perception Management, Strategic Information Warfare and Strategic Psychological Operations in Gulf II (50 False Stories by the Bush Propaganda Machine),” [on-line resource] (Cambridge, England: Indy Media, accessed on 25 February 2004); available from <http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0310gardiner.pdf>; Internet.

³² “A Brief (and partial) History of U.S. Sponsored Terrorism Abroad,” [on-line resource] (Artikel/Thema: International Door: From The Crows Eye, accessed 25 February 2004); available from <http://www.stelling.nl/konfront/3e2001/12801.html>; Internet.

³³ Ibid.

sponsored terrorism on the part of the United States, where its allies in other countries facilitated political violence against political actors that were characterized as dangerous to American interests.³⁴ What prevents the above-stated examples of U.S.-sponsored political violence from being labeled “terrorism”? One answer to this question is that the U.S. defines its interests as being associated with the political violence carried out by these actors. Therefore, a stamp of legitimacy is placed on political violence carried out by and/or supported by the U.S., and a stamp of illegitimacy is placed on political violence carried-out by actors not aligned with the interests of the U.S.

Major Concepts

The definition of the following concepts is critical to an understanding of the central research question for this study: To what extent does Hobbes’s egoistic state of nature explain the September 11 al Qaeda terrorist attacks? One major concept, Hobbes’s egoistic state of nature, is theoretically defined as: the conditions that would exist in the absence of sovereign political authority where individuals have the right to express their natural egoistic instincts (their human nature) consisting of unabated pursuit of self-preservation, self-glorification, and self-interests in any manner they see fit.³⁵ Implicit in the application of this definition to the central research problem is the assumption that the September 11 attacks represent a violent international conflict resulting from the anarchical conditions prevalent in a Hobbesian-type international state of nature.

The phrase “September 11 attacks” refers to the hijacking of four commercial

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Leslie Stephen, *Hobbes* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1904), 2.

airliners on September 11, 2001, the subsequent terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers in New York, the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and the attempted but failed crashing of a fourth plane into the White House.

The term “al Qaeda,” which originally referred to as a place where new recruits of the Mujahadin or Mujahideen signed up for the Soviet-Afghanistan War,³⁶ is an organization purportedly led by Osama, bin Laden (referred to in some print material as Usama). This study uses the “al Qaeda” spelling to refer to the organization and “Osama” to refer to bin Laden’s name. Al Qaeda has been characterized as a non-state, transnational, political organization that facilitates “terrorist” attacks in the global political arena.³⁷

The definition of terrorist attacks and the characterization of who is a terrorist often dictate the mechanisms that various actors use to counteract terrorism. This study begins with the assumption that definitions of terrorist attacks are, in and of themselves, relative, and are based on the conception that “truth, itself, is relative to the standpoint of

³⁶ Dudley Knox Library - Terrorist Group Profiles, “Al-Qaida: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002: United States Department of State, April 2003,” [on-line resource] (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 2003, accessed 30 April 2003); available from <http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/qaida.htm>; Internet.

³⁷ Michael Collins Dunn, “Usama bin Laden: the Nature of the Challenge,” *Journal of Middle East Policy* 6, no. 26 (1998): 23-26 [journal on-line] and Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on America: Al-Qaida,” [on-line resource] (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002, accessed 8 August 2002); available from <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/alqaida.htm>; Internet.

the judging subject ('beauty is in the eye of the beholder')."³⁸ Therefore, the persons defining terrorist attacks may establish a set of subjective criteria for how a particular act is defined. For the purposes of this study, terrorist attacks are partly defined as the "purposeful creation of fear for coercive purposes."³⁹ Similarly, the notion of terrorism as used in this study is based on a concept attributed to former Secretary of State George Shultz, who "defined [terrorist attacks] . . . as politically motivated violence intended to impose the terrorists' will on a population or government; . . . it amounted to a form of warfare."⁴⁰ This definition is applicable to this study because it characterizes terrorism as political violence, and draws a connection between terrorism and a general conception of war.

A straight forward definition of war is provided by Clauswitz who defines it "as the continuation of politics by other means."⁴¹ This statement by Clauswitz is not a complete summation of his theory of war. However, it is adequate for the purposes of deductively drawing a connection between wars, as intrinsically political acts, and terrorist attacks, such as the September 11 attacks, that are also intrinsically political acts.

³⁸ Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 326.

³⁹ Michael Stohl, "International Dimensions of State Terrorism," in *The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression*, ed. George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), 44.

⁴⁰ Tucker, 52.

⁴¹ David Chandler, "The Art of War on Land," [resource on-line] (San Diego, CA: *The Review of Arts, Literature, Philosophy and the Humanities*, 2003, accessed 7 April 2003); available from, <http://www.ralphmag.org/CF/land-war.htm>; Internet.

Based on this line of reasoning, terrorist attacks are conceived in this analysis as a form of warfare, and if war is the continuation of politics by other means, then by definition terrorist attacks must represent the continuation of politics by other means as well. Furthermore, if the above statement potentially contains some true elements, then it is reasonable that Clausewitz's view regarding war as a tool of persuasion in the absence of non-violent mechanisms⁴² is also applicable to a clear understanding of the reasons for terrorist attacks.

Terrorist attacks include violent tactics designed to attack and destroy the infrastructure of a state or organization. These tactics extend to such techniques as "cyber-terrorism,"⁴³ and the deployment of "chemical or biological agents,"⁴⁴ which are used to threaten large populations and/or create an environment of fear among them.

Moreover, terrorist attacks are carried out or sponsored by both state actors and non-state actors (transnational political groups and individuals engaging in political violence).⁴⁵ There is a tendency to label political violence carried out by or sponsored by Western state actors as legitimate acts of war even when the end results are similar to the

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Carol C. Dorsch and Glenn E. Schweitzer, *Super Terrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Plenum, 1998), 19-20.

⁴⁴ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 67.

⁴⁵ Lopez and Stohl, 43.

impact and devastation of violence carried out by non-state actors.⁴⁶ Non-state actors who carry out and/or sponsor terrorist acts in the global political arena are referred to as transnational terrorists.⁴⁷ K. L. Oots defines transnational terrorists as political organizations or “groups whose goals include, but need not be limited to, the provision of public goods.”⁴⁸

Because some transnational actors represent political organizations, their struggle for political power evolves as a major consideration in the analysis of their motivations. This study acknowledges the value of the concept of power, especially the notion of political power elaborated by Hans Morgenthau:

When we speak of power, we mean man’s control over the minds and actions of other men. By political we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large.⁴⁹

Political power is further conceptualized in this study as extending beyond “the formal definition of political power as moving between state apparatuses, by recognizing other less official vectors of power, such as ‘transnational’ actors.”⁵⁰ The conceptual dimensions of power, both domestically and internationally, refers to the disposition of a

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Oots, 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, brief ed., rev. by Kenneth Thompson (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 30.

⁵⁰ Patricia Seed, “More Colonial and Postcolonial Discourses,” *Latin American Research Review* 28 (1993): 147.

political structure.⁵¹ Non-state terrorists view themselves in a position subordinate to that of dominant, nation-state political actors, and acts of terrorism represent a means or vehicle for acting out of a particular sense of possibilities within perceived dimensions of power.⁵²

While non-state transnational actors increasingly represent major players in global relations the role of state actors in the causes of international terrorism cannot be ignored. The use of the term state in this study represents the adoption of the Hobbesian definition as designated in the terms “The Great Leviathan,” the *civitas* (loosely translated in Latin as commonwealth, and sovereign political authority. The state is further defined in this study as an agent for social organization.⁵³ The difficulty in defining and conceptualizing the notion of the state lies in the breadth of frameworks⁵⁴ reflecting various characterizations of the state or the nation-state. Any view regarding the state or nation-state, “in relation to Hobbesian theory, is that the state must be defined clearly enough to understand the individual’s relation to it (as in the relation between a citizen and the sovereign).”⁵⁵ The state is further defined in this study as a structure that is “established

⁵¹ Ryn, 1.

⁵² Betts, 1.

⁵³ R.M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege/ Oxford University Press, 1947), vii.

⁵⁴ Rick Clifton Moore, "Hegemony, Agency and Dialectical Tension in Ellul's Technological Society," *Journal of Communication* 48 (1998): 133.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

within society for the achievement of conscious and therefore limited purposes.”⁵⁶ In addition, the state is conceptualized as being sovereign in nature.⁵⁷ This definition of the state is in opposition to the existence of transnational groups such as Al Qaeda, whose lack of sovereignty can actually be viewed as a strategic advantage. This is due to the fact that states or nation-states seeking retribution against transnational groups have no specific geographical area of sovereign land to attack in a retaliatory strike.

Fredrick Engels, who conceptualizes the state apparatus as a "'medium' through which the interests of the ruling class are represented" provides an interesting and relevant contrast to Hobbes's definition of the state.⁵⁸ However, contrasts are so stark that they contradict Hobbes's definition of the state. Hobbes argues that the state apparatus is a medium for the establishment of sovereign political order, the protection of individuals from one another, and the protection from foreign invasion.⁵⁹ The sovereign is the political power and authority within the state that is responsible for maintaining political and social order.⁶⁰ This sovereign, political authority is established through the

⁵⁶ MacIver, 5-6.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 8-9.

⁵⁸ Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, *Pre Capitalist Modes of Production* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 35.

⁵⁹ Richard Tuck, *Hobbes* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 65-67.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

social contract and represents a mutual agreement between all rational individuals living in a state of nature that relative peace is preferable to a constant state of war.⁶¹ This relative peace represents the rational pursuit of self-interest, as conceptualized in a contract based on the idea that it is mutually beneficial for everyone to agree to give up hostilities in favor of peace.⁶² Hypothetically, extending this concept to an international sovereign, an international government, world polity, or world state conceivably would lead to a contract among various sovereign nation-states and transnational political actors to transfer some rights to an agreed upon global political authority.⁶³ This international sovereign would have the political authority to keep the relative peace among international political actors.⁶⁴ According to Mary Parker Follett:

Whether we can have a lasting peace or not depends upon whether we have advanced far enough to be capable of loyalty to a higher unit, not as a substitute for our old patriotism to our country, but in addition to it. Peace will come by the group consciousness rising from the national to the international unit. This cannot be done through the imagination alone but needs actual experiments in world union, or rather experiments first in the union of two or more nations. Men go round lecturing to kind-hearted audiences and say, 'Can you not be loyal to something bigger than a nation?' And the kind-hearted audiences reply, 'Certainly, we will now, at your very interesting suggestion, be loyal to a league of nations.' But this

⁶¹ Russell Hardin, *Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 2 [database on-line]; available from Questia Digitized Library.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ G. M. Tamás, "Beyond the Nation State," *Social Research* 63, no. 1 (1996): 191.

⁶⁴ Mary Parker Follett, *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 348.

is only a wish on their part, its realization can never come by wishing but only by willing, and willing is a process, you have to put yourself in a certain place from which to will. We must, in other words, try experiments with a league of nations, and out of the actual life of that league will come loyalty to it. We are not ready for the life of the larger group because some teacher of ethics has taught us 'to respect other men's loyalties.' We are ready for it when our experience has incorporated into every tissue of our thought life [sic] the knowledge that we need other men's loyalties. Loyalty, therefore, is not the chickens running back to the coop, also it is not a sentiment which we decide arbitrarily to adopt, it is the outcome of a process, the process of belonging.⁶⁵

In the absence of the adoption of sovereign political authority, a Hobbesian state of nature would exist among individuals where people "have the right to do anything they wish."⁶⁶ The international state of nature represents the conditions that exist within the international political arena wherein nation-states and non-state political actors have the right, in the absence of an international sovereign, to pursue their perceived interests in any manner they see fit.⁶⁷ What this represents is a condition of anarchy within the global political arena.⁶⁸ The concept global political arena or international political arena is used in a parallel fashion within this research. These concepts are defined as an ordering of global political actors within an international hierarchy of which dominance

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Jessop, 18.

⁶⁷ A. C. Ewing, *The Individual, The State and World Government* (New York: The McMillan Co., 1947), 188.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

and subordination are key elements.⁶⁹ It is this dominant and subordinate hierarchy within the anarchical international state of nature that makes political violence, such as war and terrorism, appear necessary.⁷⁰

The theoretical definitions of these major concepts provide the basis for exploration into the elements of the central research question that this study seeks to answer. The subsequent chapters of this study are designed to illustrate the reliability of deductive reasoning as a means for clarifying the validity of the stated assumption.

Limitations and Outline of This Study

Based on the central research question and the implicit hypothesis statement that the September 11 attacks were influenced by Hobbesian concepts embraced by al Qaeda, the limitations of this research are reflected in the narrow extent to which there is ease in applying the concepts of the Hobbesian state of nature and the egoistic nature of humans to the goals and objectives of al Qaeda in the facilitation of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This study does not seek to provide a critical analysis of the full scope of Hobbes's political philosophy and the many logical and practical aspects of his theory, nor does it seek to point out logical inconsistencies in the structure of his theory. It is not intended to focus on al Qaeda per se, i.e., its organizational structure, how it recruits individuals, or the technical aspects of how it facilitates terrorist attacks. Furthermore, this study does not seek to provide a lengthy elaboration of the history of terrorism or an

⁶⁹ Peter Clark and Anthony Davis, "The Power of Dirt," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 26 (1989): 651.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

extensive discussion of the varying categories of terrorism. These are not the focus of this study.

Outline of Study

This chapter explained the statement of the central research question and the implicit problem addressed by this study, the research design, and the theoretical framework and definitions of major concepts. Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature related to the central research question. Chapter 3 provides a descriptive analysis of Hobbes's theory of the egoistic state of nature as outlined in *Leviathan*. Chapter 4 outlines the rationale behind the adoption of the Hobbesian theory of a state of nature and the egoistic conception of human nature, extended to international affairs, as a feasible explanation for the causes of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The conclusions offered in Chapter 5 provide a brief synopsis of the dissertation, which leads to a summation of the results of the research.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

International Relations Theory

Because this study involves an analysis of why a political phenomenon (the September 11 terrorist attacks) occurred in the international political arena, it is important to provide a survey of the applicable international relations literature. The breadth of international relations theories regarding the causes of conflict between international political actors is vast. Some international relations studies reflect the role of the state in causing violent conflict in the global political arena. Mark Lagon reasons that a significant number of contemporary international relations theories focus on the state and leaders of states as the major actors in international relations.¹ Lagon's main focus is on political realists, their obsession with the state and the limitations of the realist model in terms of the realities that evolved after the Cold War.² In regards to the state, Rick Clifton Moore, in "Hegemony, Agency and Dialectical Tension in Ellul's Technological Society," illustrates the fact that defining the state is difficult because of

¹ Mark P. Lagon, "Alternatives to Structural Realism: International Relations after the Cold War," *Perspectives on Political Science* 23, no. 2 (1994): 68.

² Ibid.

the multiplicity of frameworks and theories that pervade conceptualizations regarding it.³ Authors Demko and Wood also take on the task of defining the state. They see the state arising from a conceptualization of international relations “that is made up of discrete nations, each of which could be given its own autonomous territory.”⁴ This view reflects the realities of the emergence of European states as the dominant force in the international political order but does not account for non-European political actors or transnational political actors.⁵ Shlomo Ben-Ami, argues that the state reflects the role of nationalism in the development of modern political authority.⁶ Seth Asumah, on the other hand, focuses on the definition of the state as it applies to the state apparatus in Africa and the often unique nature of policy shifts on that Continent.⁷ Nevertheless, Asumah provides a good structural definition for a generic characterization of the state. R. M. MacIver provides an outline of the state in his work entitled *The Modern State*.⁸

³ Rick Clifton Moore, “Hegemony, Agency and Dialectical Tension in Ellul's Technological Society,” *Journal of Communication* 48, no. 3 (1998): 133.

⁴ George J. Demko and William B. Wood, *Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the Twenty-First Century* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 228.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Shlomo Ben-Ami, ed., introduction to *Ethnic Challenges to the Modern Nation-State*, ed. Yoav Peled and Alberto Spektorowski (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 1.

⁷ Seth Asumah, “The Nation-State and Public Policy in Africa: Reconsidering the Effects of Structural Variables and Systemic Dynamics,” *Western Journal of Black Studies* 22 (1998): 1.

⁸ R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1947), vii.

Specifically, MacIver defines the evolution and role of the state.⁹ In terms of the evolution of the state, Hardin and Hirst, in *Pre Capitalist Modes of Production*, outline the stages of the various modes of production as they relate to the evolution and role of the state as a political instrument and structure serving the interests of the ruling economic class.¹⁰ Specifically, this book posits that the state evolved based on changes in the economic mode of production of various societies. All of the above sources are used to establish the predominant role of the state, a sovereign political entity representing a body of people--a society--in a particular territory that is conscious of its identity, in international relations theory.

The preoccupation with giving the state so much attention within many international relations frameworks, as noted by Lagon, tends to negate “the roles of transnational [or non state]. . . actors and of ideas in world politics.”¹¹ Miles Kahler points out that the emergence of transnational political actors requires theoretical conceptions that look beyond interstate conflict.¹² Janos Kis, in “Beyond the Nation-state,” argues that political analysis must take into account such central factors as ethnicity, and that states must cope with transnationalism as an emerging phenomenon

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production* (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1975), 1-20 passim.

¹¹ Lagon, 68.

¹² Miles Kahler “Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory After 1945,” in *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, ed. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 33-35.

that may compete with the political power of the state.¹³ G. M. Tamás also identifies the role and importance of ethnicity and transnationalism in political affairs.¹⁴ Implicit in the arguments of Kis and Tamás is the point that non-state actors, thus non-state actors, are becoming integral parts of international affairs.¹⁵

For the purposes of the theoretical concerns of this study a connection between non-state, transnational political actors and global terrorism is critical. Oots, for example, characterizes transnational terrorist groups as non-state actors who operate as interest groups and who have specific goals and objectives.¹⁶ As political transnational organizations continue to become more important actors in international relations, they interact more and more with states.¹⁷ Ivo D. Duchacek points out those interactions between transnational groups and states are characteristically different from traditional interstate relations.¹⁸

¹³ Janos Kis, "Beyond the Nation-state," *Social Research* 63, no. 1 (1996): 194.

¹⁴ G. M. Tamás, "Ethnarchy and Ethno-Anarchism," *Social Research* 63, no. 1 (1996): 171-172.

¹⁵ Kent Layne Oots, *A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 4.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ivo D. Duchacek, *The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among and Across Nations* (Westview Press, 1986), 208.

Both state and non-state political actors represent key players in the global political arena. A. C. Ewing focuses on the relationship between the individual as a political actor and the state as a political actor.¹⁹ Ewing defines the international state of nature as a set of conditions that exist within the international political order wherein states, as well as non-state political actors, have the right, in the absence of an international sovereign, to pursue their interests in any manner they see fit.²⁰

This unabated pursuit of interests within the global political arena leads to an international political order that reflects a “dominant-subordinate [*sic*] hierarchy.”²¹ Clark and Davis put forth the position that this hierarchy establishes “the dominant [political power] with a means to distinguish itself from the subordinate while also providing the dominant with a device to control and manage dominant-subordinate [*sic*] relations.”²² While the focus of this position is on domestic societies, extrapolating this concept to international relations provides one view for understanding how dominant political actors, such as the United States, exercise power over subordinate political actors.

¹⁹ A. C. Ewing, *The Individual, the State and World Government* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), 1-8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 188.

²¹ Peter Clark and Anthony Davis, “The Power of Dirt: An Exploration of Secular Defilement in Anglo-Canadian Culture,” *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 26, no. 4 (1989): 651.

²² *Ibid.*

World Politics: Trend and Transformation, by Kegley and Wittkopf, highlights the relationship between Hobbes's political conceptualizations and the nature of international affairs.²³ This book provides an overview of the spectrum of global political activities, designated as international relations, delineating important theoretical perspectives and trends.²⁴ The relationship between Hobbes's political philosophy and international relations is further illustrated by Murphy in his essay, "The Grotian Vision of World Order."²⁵ This journal article explains how the implications of Hobbes's and Spinoza's political conceptions affect the character of international relations theory.²⁶ It focuses upon the need for an international sovereign to regulate conflict in the global political arena.²⁷ This article further highlights the theory of the Dutch humanist Huig de Groot, or Grotius, who sought to develop "a general theory of law that he hoped would bring order out of the chaos of international conflict."²⁸

²³ Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 7th ed. (New York: St. Martin's/Worth, 1999).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Cornelius F. Murphy, "The Grotian Vision of World Order," *American Journal of International Law* 76, no. 3 (1982): 7-9.

²⁶ Ibid., 484.

²⁷ Ibid., 477.

²⁸ Ibid., 480.

Equally important, David Boucher's analysis in *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present*, seeks to draw a connection between classical and contemporary international relations theory.²⁹ Boucher provides a comparison between the Hobbesian approach to international relations (as represented in classical realism) with the contemporary realist approach as delineated in modern international relations theory.³⁰ One important element of the contemporary realist approach is the concept of *balance of power* as delineated by Hans Morganthau, whose concept of balance of power is based on the existence of conditions in the global political arena where actors pursue the interests of their states based on the respective power abilities (the capacities of states to pursue their self-interests)³¹ This view is reflected by Alfonso Gonzalez who points out that contemporary balance of power politics evolved out of the conflict between European states and culminated in the bipolarization of the post World War II global structure.³²

Hobbes, International Anarchy, and the International State of Nature

The contemporary realist model takes many of Hobbes's basic premises and applies them to modern international relations. For example, realist Kenneth Waltz

²⁹ David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 11.

³⁰ Ibid., 1-17, passim.

³¹ Hans Morganthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, brief and rev. ed., ed. Kenneth Thompson (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 183-186.

³² Alfonso Gonzalez, ed., introduction to *The New Third World*, ed. Jim Norwine (Boulder: Perseus Publishing, 1998), 3.

provides a highly relevant analysis of human nature as it relates to international conflict.³³

Waltz points out that the state-of-war conditions that exist in international relations are directly related to human behavior.³⁴ If this is the case, then international conflict is analogous to Hobbes's state of nature and consequently represents an international state of nature.

What, then, is the proof for the existence of the international state of nature? Jahn Beate presents one argument for the existence of the international state of nature.³⁵ Beate argues that in the absence of an international sovereign, relations between global political actors are congruent to the relations of groups in "primitive" societies that have no definitive sovereign political authority.³⁶ Similarly, Morgenthau delineates the relationship between the state-of-nature conditions that exist in primitive societies and those that exist in the global political arena.³⁷ These conceptualizations share the Hobbesian view that primitive societies--in the absence of sovereign political authority--

³³ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 16-42 passim.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Jahn Beate, *The Cultural Construction of International Relations: The Invention of the State of Nature* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 151-153.

³⁶ Ibid., 151-153.

³⁷ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, rev., ed. Kenneth Thompson (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 255, quoted in Jahn Beate, *The Cultural Construction of International Relations: The Invention of the State of Nature* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 151-153.

are equivalent to the conditions prevalent in the global political arena in terms of intergroup conflict. For example, Morgenthau offers a descriptive analysis of two primitive groups, the Australian Aborigines and the Yurok Native American tribes of California, to parallel the political conditions of these groups to the conditions prevalent in the international state of nature.³⁸

Hidemi Suganmi, contends that Hugo Grotius provides further argument for the existence of the international state of nature.³⁹ Suganmi points out that actors participating in the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international state of nature are subject to the same egoistic tendencies as individuals in the state of nature.⁴⁰

Moreover, David P. Fidler and Stanley Hoffmann illustrate that human political actors, through the political institutions or political organizations that they represent, express certain egoistic tendencies.⁴¹ These authors posit that in the absence of an international political sovereign, these egoistic tendencies are expressed rightly and freely.⁴²

Similarly, Hoffmann, in *Gulliver's Troubles: Or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy*,

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Hidemi Suganmi, "Grotius and International Equality," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 228.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ David P. Fidler and Stanley Hoffmann, ed., introduction to *Rousseau on International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), xlv.

⁴² Ibid.

extends this argument by pointing out that in international relations these egoistic tendencies reflect a “fragmentation”⁴³ of solidarity among global political actors. Likewise, Raymond Aron agrees that the global political arena represents conditions where no sovereign authority is in place.⁴⁴ Dennis Pirages, in “The Origins of Ecopolitics: The Impending Revolution,” draws a similar definitive connection between Hobbes’s state of nature and the international state of nature.⁴⁵ In like manner, Bowie and Simon argue that, based on the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international state of nature, no political actor (either state or non-state) can be expected to act in any other manner other than what is in its perceived self-interest.⁴⁶

Such actions on the part of global political actors, are characterized as rights (*razón de estad/raison d'état*) in the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international state of nature.⁴⁷ Friedrich Meinecke and Douglas Scott identify this right or “necessity

⁴³ Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles; Or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 323.

⁴⁴ Raymond Aron, “The Anarchical Order of Power,” *Daedalus* 124, no. 3 (1995): 27-30.

⁴⁵ Dennis Pirages, “The Origins of Ecopolitics: The Impending Revolution,” in *Toward a Just World Order*, ed. Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 474.

⁴⁶ Norman E. Bowie and Robert L. Simon, *The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy*, 2d. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 233-234.

⁴⁷ Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D'Aetat and Its Place in Modern History*, trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957), 5.

of state” (as explicated in Chapter 4) the rights of global actors to exhibit behaviors only limited by their dimensions of power and abilities in the international state of nature.⁴⁸ In addition, Perry suggests that all global actors will take actions that are in their perceived self-interests.⁴⁹ The concept of the right or necessity of state also involves the issue of the nature of the behavior of human political actors.⁵⁰ Gibney postulates that human political actors that operate in the international state of nature have no moral responsibilities beyond those that represent the pursuit of their own interests.⁵¹

Another argument for the existence of the international state of nature becomes apparent when John Rawls’ “original position”⁵² postulation is extended to international affairs. Toward that end, Thomas Franck deduces that if Rawls’ original position were applied to the realities of international relations, then it would logically lead to a conception of the world similar to that of a Hobbesian notion of an international state of nature.⁵³

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ralph Barton Perry, *Present Conflict of Ideals: A Study of the Philosophical Background of the World War* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1922), 276.

⁵⁰ Mark Gibney, *Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 73.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, rev. (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard, 1999), 52-53.

⁵³ Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 220-221.

Conceptualizing a Hobbesian notion of an international state of nature is dependent on an understanding of Hobbes's concept of equality. According to Hobbes, the relative equality of both individuals and political actors is a major cause of violent conflict.⁵⁴ Reflecting on this notion, George Soros (founder of the Open Society Institute), suggests that the international political arena is analogous to George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, wherein the animals represent political actors and there exists a hierarchy of equals.⁵⁵ Similarly, Dickinson suggests that the hierarchy that exists in international relations represents an unequal alliance between various political actors.⁵⁶ In the current arena of world politics, the United States is the actor that, to a large degree, controls this unequal alliance of hierarchical actors, or what MacLeod refers to as a "community of interests."⁵⁷ Everett Hagen posits that this community of interests (or unequal alliance of hierarchical actors) is not only hierarchical but also exclusive, in that it excludes some

⁵⁴ Boucher, 147.

⁵⁵ George Soros, "America's Global Role: Why the Fight for a Worldwide Open Society Begins at Home," [magazine on-line] (Boston: *The American Prospect*, June 2003, accessed 5 July 2003); available from http://www.soros.org/gsbio/american_prospect_052703.htm; Internet.

⁵⁶ Edwin Dewitt Dickinson, *The Equality of States in International Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 50.

⁵⁷ William Christie MacLeod, *The Origin and History of Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1931), 5.

actors out of the community.⁵⁸ This exclusion of some actors by a dominant community of interests, according to Hagen, leads to acrimoniousness and ultimately desperate and radical behavior on the part of the excluded actors.⁵⁹

Another important element in understanding the relevance of Hobbes's conception of an international state of nature lies in his elaboration of the concept of relativism. R. M. Hare provides an analysis of the nature of moral relativism.⁶⁰ His view coincides with Hobbes's conception of relativism (Hobbes's believes that there is no moral objectivity) in terms of the role of perception in establishing ethical principles.⁶¹ Ivo D. Duchacek further extends the concept of relativism as it applies to the study of international relations. In his book, *The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among and Across Nations*, he argues that within some international relations theories there is a focus on the relative application of "whether there should be a difference between moral standards applying to an individual, acting on his or her behalf, and those applying to a king, prince, or statesman, acting on behalf of a territorial community."⁶² This issue is parallel to the previously noted idea of reason or necessity of state. Toward that end,

⁵⁸ Everett E. Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change," in *Readings in Modern Political Analysis*, ed. Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. Neubauer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 188-189.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ R. M. Hare, *Plato* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 5.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Duchacek, 43

Meinecke and Scott postulate that “state interest and self-interest were [*sic*] in essence identical.”⁶³

Hobbes’s Political Philosophy

Hobbes's political philosophy has been extensively studied and analyzed. Some of these studies have focused on the use of Hobbesian political theory as an explanatory tool for evaluating the causes of violence and conflict among individuals and political actors.

The clearest outline of Hobbesian political philosophy is provided in *Leviathan* where Hobbes establishes the completeness of his political theory illustrating his concept of egoistic human nature, the state of nature, and the necessity of political authority.⁶⁴ *Leviathan* is used in this study to provide a basis for understanding Hobbes’s conception of the state of nature and the role of certain egoistic tendencies in promoting conflict and violence.

One relevant study of Hobbes’s political philosophy, by T. E. Jessop, highlights the influence of the English Civil War on Hobbes’s ideas.⁶⁵ The state-of-war conditions of this conflict influenced the nature and content of *Leviathan*.⁶⁶ Jessop discusses the

⁶³ Meinecke and Scott, 68.

⁶⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Forme & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill*, ed. Alfred Rayney Waller (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1904), xiii-xiv.

⁶⁵ T. E. Jessop, *Thomas Hobbes* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1960), 18.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

Hobbesian view of egoistic human nature,⁶⁷ and provides a descriptive analysis of Hobbes's philosophy from the standpoint that it represents a "system" (in terms of a structured set of assumptions).⁶⁸

In *Hobbes and His Critics*, Bowle points out that Hobbes challenged the contemporary philosophical and political norms of his time.⁶⁹ Bowle focuses on the effect of Hobbes's philosophy on European intellectual thought and illustrates the response Hobbes's philosophy drew from the intellectual and academic community of the time.⁷⁰ Many of the initial responses to Hobbes's political philosophy were negative and in some circles his ideas were considered dangerous.⁷¹ The *Oxford Companion to Philosophy* states that Hobbes's ideas at one point even had a damaging affect on the personal lives and careers of some of those who supported his theory or who positively evaluated it.⁷² This book provides analyses of the conceptualizations of important political philosophers from Plato to Nietzsche.⁷³

⁶⁷ Ibid., 18-19.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 8.

⁶⁹ John Bowle, *Hobbes and His Critics* (London: Jonathon Cape, 1951), 13.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ted Honderich, editor, *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 653.

⁷² Ibid., 653.

⁷³ Ibid., viii.

In the *Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, Samuel I. Mintz, in a manner similar to Bowle's, sets out to describe the reactions to Hobbes's philosophy during Hobbes's lifetime and provides a well-defined orientation regarding the main influences on Hobbes's intellectual thought.⁷⁴ Mintz points out that Hobbes was well versed in Latin and Greek and identifies the influence of his reading and subsequent translation of the Latin versions of the *Peloponnesian War* and the *Melian Dialog* on the development of Hobbes's political philosophy.⁷⁵ Mintz also establishes the influence of Euclid geometry on the structure of Hobbes's intellectual thought.⁷⁶ Congruent to the evaluation by Mintz, scholar D. G. James further elaborates on the intellectual influences of Hobbes, discussing the effects of the theories of Mersenne, Descartes, and Galileo on the nature of Hobbes's philosophy and structure of his political theory.⁷⁷ James further states that Hobbes was exposed to a classical education, one founded in Greek science and logic.⁷⁸ Hobbes continuously drew upon many of these academic and intellectual influences in

⁷⁴ Samuel I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (England: Cambridge at the University Press, 1970), 1-6.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁷⁷ D. G. James, *The Life of Reason: Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbroke* (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1949), 2.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, ix.

formulating his political and philosophical conceptions. James highlights the fact that Hobbes's theory was an important part of the Age of Reason and the Age of Neo-classicism.⁷⁹

The formulation of Hobbes's political and philosophical conceptions reflects the structure of his methodology, which was designed to yield correct conclusions via its morphology.⁸⁰ R. E. Ewin points out that the structure of Hobbes's methodology can be seen throughout his theory.⁸¹ Furthermore, Ewin outlines the concepts of morality and ethics in Hobbes's philosophy, highlighting the role of his methodology in the implications of his moral and ethical theory.⁸² Ewin also illustrates the connection between Hobbes's ethical conceptions and how these lead to the ultimate conclusion of his political theory, which is represented in the idea of the state of nature. Understanding Hobbes's methodology is the key to deciphering his political philosophy. Toward that end, Howard Warrender's "Editor's *Introduction*" to the *Latin version of De Cive* is an

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ R. E. Ewin, *Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 17-18.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

excellent descriptive summary of Hobbes's methodology as it relates to his political philosophy.⁸³

While some scholars have focused on the relationship between Hobbes's methodology and his political philosophy, others have focused on the relationship between his philosophical conceptions and his political theory. Leo Strauss, who delineates the various themes in Hobbes's philosophy, which culminate in his political theory, provides one relevant excursion into this area.⁸⁴ Strauss notes that Hobbes was motivated to develop a political sociology regarding the nature of social order.⁸⁵ Strauss' overall focus is to provide a descriptive analysis of Hobbes's philosophy.

The complexity of Hobbes's overall philosophy is not lost on the political philosopher Spinoza. Spinoza extends major concepts in Hobbes's political philosophy within his own conceptualizations.⁸⁶ Frederick Pollock outlines the connection between Hobbes's political theory and Spinoza's in *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*. Pollock's

⁸³ Howard Warrender, ed. and trans., *Introduction to De Cive: The Latin Version Entitled in the First Edition Elementorum Philosophiæ Sectio Tertia De Cive*, and in later editions *Elementa Philosophica De Cive*, by Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 1-17 passim.

⁸⁴ Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952), 1.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1899), 301.

book identifies the similarities between the political philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza.⁸⁷

One element of similarity that Spinoza shared with Hobbes was an understanding of the role of human nature in political actions. Hobbes's concept of human nature focuses on the expression of egoistic behavior.⁸⁸ Howard Warrender elaborates on the role of Hobbes's egoistic analysis of human nature and its role in the development of social order and obligation.⁸⁹ Additionally, Warrender points out that it is the egoistic tendencies prevalent in human nature that lead to the necessity of social obligation.⁹⁰ Hobbes's ideas regarding ethics and morality are reflected in his theory of social obligation.⁹¹ In *A Short History of Ethics, Greek and Modern*, Rogers surveys ethical theory from the Sophists to English Rational Idealism, identifying natural human egoistic tendencies as the basis of Hobbes's ethical theory and, ultimately, his concept of social obligation.⁹² Consistent with Warrender, Richard Tuck illustrates the Hobbesian concept

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 13-29 passim.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 2.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Reginald A. P. Rogers, *A Short History of Ethics, Greek and Modern* (London: Macmillan, 1911), 257.

⁹² Ibid.

of egoistic human nature, ethics, and social/political order.⁹³ In *Hobbes*, Leslie Stephen also discusses Hobbes's theory of the egoistic nature of humans and how human nature leads to the state of nature.⁹⁴ Stephen establishes a structured, descriptive analysis of Hobbes's overall philosophy and identifies key elements in Hobbes's political theory.⁹⁵ Likewise, in *Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation* Anthony O'Hear discusses the role of egoism and human nature in Hobbes's political philosophy.⁹⁶ O'Hear suggests that if something is perceived as pleasurable, then it is by definition good.⁹⁷ Projecting this conceptualization to Hobbes's political philosophy leads to the following proposition: if a thing is good, then it is in an individual's best interest.⁹⁸ O'Hear's overall focus centers on the role of evolution in determining egoism in human nature.⁹⁹ Similarly, in *Why Be Moral? The Egoistic Challenge*, John Van Ingen identifies the various distinctions of self-interested behavior

⁹³ Richard Tuck, *Hobbes* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1989), vii-xviii.

⁹⁴ Leslie Stephen, *Hobbes* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1904), 2.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Anthony O'Hear, *Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 111.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., vii.

as a designation of egoistic tendencies.¹⁰⁰ Van Ingen focuses on the various theories and conceptualizations that utilize the egoist perspective.¹⁰¹

In addition to egoistic-based self-interest, Hobbes identifies competitiveness as a major egoistic tendency that is prevalent in human nature. In a like manner, Bernard Campbell's study of the role of the ideas of Wallace and Malthus about population corresponds to the Hobbesian conception of the competition for limited resources in the state of nature.¹⁰² Additionally, Campbell analyzes the role of Darwinian evolutionary theory based on a geographical and regional "ecology model."¹⁰³ Campbell's book is used in this study to illustrate the competitive nature of the evolutionary process, and his perspective unwittingly supports the Hobbesian concept of a natural competition among individuals.¹⁰⁴ In his writings on population, Malthus also discusses the competition for limited resources and its connection to population growth.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, O'Hear also

¹⁰⁰ John Van Ingen, *Why Be Moral? The Egoistic Challenge* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1994), 39.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Bernard Campbell, *Human Ecology: The Story of Our Place in Nature from Prehistory to the Present*, 2d. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995), 4.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁵ T. R. Malthus, *Parallel Chapters from the First and Second Editions of an Essay on the Principle of Population* (New York: Macmillan, 1895), 9.

focuses on the connection of human evolution to the conditions of human nature.¹⁰⁶

The State of Nature and the Hobbesian Social Contract

The analysis of the role of evolution in the competitive aspect of egoistic human nature is relevant because (in Hobbesian political theory) it is these conditions that lead to the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the state of nature. In the state of nature, a state of war would naturally exist because everyone would have the right to do whatever he or she wants.¹⁰⁷ Bertrand Russell, for example, establishes that a state of war would naturally exist because each individual would feel threatened by every other individual.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, Russell gives an analysis of the state of nature.¹⁰⁹ Russell's outline of conceptions of the state of nature contrasts with the Hobbesian state of nature.¹¹⁰ Similarly, Jean Hampton outlines the various causes of conflict in the state of nature and analyzes the applicability of Hobbes's solution as a mechanism to limit this conflict.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ O'Hear, 111.

¹⁰⁷ Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 550.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Jean Hampton, *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1-25 passim.

Hobbes's state of the nature is characterized by equality. Toward that end, T. V. Smith identifies that the Hobbesian state of nature is based on the relative equality of individuals.¹¹² According to Hobbes, the reality of the concept of equality and the overwhelming egoistic tendencies of human nature result in the state-of-war conditions found in the state of nature.¹¹³

According to Hobbes, the only way to end the state of nature is through the social contract, which is an agreement between competing individuals.¹¹⁴ Individuals in the state of nature rationalize that the mutual advantage of agreeing to the contract is more beneficial than the conditions of the state of nature.¹¹⁵ In *Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy*, Russell Hardin illustrates that Hobbes's social contract is an example of mutual advantage.¹¹⁶ Additionally, Hardin argues that the idea of mutual advantage is based on the democratic principle of popular consent and only works because it can be demonstrated to be in the self-interest of all or most of the members of a given society.¹¹⁷

¹¹² T. V. Smith, *The American Philosophy of Equality* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927), 20-23.

¹¹³ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 82.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Russell Hardin, *Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 2.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 2.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

Likewise, David Gauthier argues that mutual agreement is a basis for right society and constitutes a moral foundation upon which correct principals of society are established.¹¹⁸ Gauthier points out that a mutually beneficial contract between competing, self-interested parties can be the basis for the best possible political authority.¹¹⁹ Correspondingly, Simon Blackburn defines the social contract and delineates the specific character of the Hobbesian social contract.¹²⁰ Likewise, in “Social Contract or Social Covenant,” Jonathan Sacks illustrates the logic behind the social contract.¹²¹ Sacks provides an analysis of Hobbes’s conception of the social contract as compared to other social contract theories.¹²²

Political Violence, War, and Terrorism

Chapter 1 defined terrorism as a form of political violence. The relevant literature regarding the specific character of political violence perpetuated as terrorism reflects studies regarding the causes, nature, goals, and consequences of terrorism and leads to an understanding of various relevant definitions of terrorist acts. Because of the political

¹¹⁸ David Gauthier, *Morals by Agreement* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1986), 9-11.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1996), 354.

¹²¹ Ibid., 354.

¹²² Ibid.

nature of terrorism, difficulties arise in objectively analyzing the concept, both theoretically and practically. This study begins the analysis of terrorism by defining political violence.

Toward that end, Eugene J. Meehan in *Contemporary Political Thought* provides one approach relevant to conceptualizing political violence.¹²³ Meehan's work identifies the various theoretical ideas behind the phenomenon of political violence.¹²⁴

Historically, political violence, inclusive of terrorism, has been used as a mechanism to achieve political objectives. One type of political violence that is used to achieve political objectives is war. As noted earlier, Lawsuits conceptualizes war is being simply an extension of politics through violence.¹²⁵ Correspondingly, Emmanuel Sivan, in "The Mythologies of Religious Radicalism: Judaism and Islam," argues that non-conventional warfare, such as terrorism, is a political act and represents political violence in the same sense as conventional warfare.¹²⁶

¹²³ Eugene Meehan, *Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), 282.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ David Chandler, "The Art of War on Land," [resource on-line] (San Diego, CA: *The Review of Arts, Literature, Philosophy and the Humanities*, 2003, accessed 7 April 2003); available from, <http://www.ralphmag.org/CF/land-war.htm>; Internet.

¹²⁶ Emmanuel Sivan, "The Mythologies of Religious Radicalism: Judaism and Islam," *Terrorism and Violence* 3 (1991): 71–82.

The issue of using political violence as a means to achieve political ends is taken up by Kelman.¹²⁷ Kelman focuses on the role of war and political violence as a mechanism for achieving political objectives.¹²⁸ Yet another scholar, Karma Nabulsi, argues that the “institutionalization” of political violence by societies is largely based on a type of “moral relativism” that is centered on the following principles: (a) if our society, state, or group carries out political violence against others, then we are justified and right; however, (b) if another society, state, or group carries out political violence against us then they are not justified and consequently are wrong.¹²⁹ Nabulsi focuses on the contradictions in these principles in his explanatory analysis regarding the nature and causes of war.¹³⁰

The type of moral relativism noted above, as applied to the facilitation of political violence, is congruent to Hobbes's concept of the relative nature of right and wrong and good and bad. Furthermore, moral relativism is used by al Qaeda, the G. W. Bush Administration, and elements within the American mainstream media to justify the respective use of political violence.

¹²⁷ Herbert C. Kelman “Internationalizing Military Force,” in *Preventing World War: Some Proposals*, ed. Morton Deutsch, William M. Evan, and Quincy Wright (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), 116-118.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Karma Nabulsi, *Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law Book* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 167.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 1.

The use of moral relativism as a mechanism to justify political violence is further illustrated by John Exposito.¹³¹ Exposito points out that the characterization of what defines political violence as terrorism is determined by who is doing the characterizing.¹³² For example, there is a reasonable chance that an Israeli government official would probably consider political violence carried out against Israeli civilians as terrorism. Conversely, there is a reasonable chance that a member of HAMAS (the Palestinian based Islamic resistance movement) would probably consider this same attack a legitimate opposition action as opposed to a terrorist attack.

How definitions are applied to political violence can represent the relative application of this violence toward political actions. For example, in “A Time to Break Silence,” Martin Luther King, Jr. identifies the contradictions presented through the use of political violence by the U.S. in the Vietnam War.¹³³ Similarly, the School of the Americas indirectly represents the expression of state sponsored political violence on the part of the United States through the training of its allies in other countries to facilitate

¹³¹ Exposito, 280.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Martin Luther King, Jr., “A Time to Break Silence,” in *I Have A Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World*, ed. James M. Washington (San Francisco: Harper, 1986), 135.

political violence against political actors that are deemed antithetical to American interests.¹³⁴

Examples such as these illustrate how the United States government applies the term terrorism in a relative manner. Elements within the mainstream media also respond to the relative use of the term terrorism. In the journal article “Seeing is Remembering: How Visuals Contribute to Learning from Television News,” Doris A. Graber focuses on the role of the media in shaping public opinion.¹³⁵ Graber points out that the media is not fundamentally objective in its shaping of public opinion.¹³⁶ The shaping of public opinion by the media in determining what is terrorism is essential in characterizing terrorist acts as a form of political violence.¹³⁷ One author that delineates this reality is Richard Schaffert, who points out that “acts of terrorism are attributed to literally every known source of political violence.”¹³⁸

¹³⁴ “A Brief (and partial) History of U.S. Sponsored Terrorism Abroad,” [on-line resource] (Artikel/Thema: International Door: From The Crows Eye, accessed 25 February 2004); available from <http://www.stelling.nl/konfront/3e2001/12801.html>; Internet.

¹³⁵ Doris A. Graber, “Seeing is Remembering: How Visuals Contribute to Learning from Television News,” *Journal of Communication* 40, no. 3 (1990): 134.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Richard W. Schaffert, ed., introduction to *Media Coverage and Political Terrorists: A Quantitative Analysis* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), xiv.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

Another more general approach to understanding conflict facilitated as political violence is to carry out an historical, teleological analysis of conflict facilitated as political violence. For example, some scholars, such as Peter Jones and Andrew S. Skinner, argue that by extending Adam Smith's four-stage approach to an historical analysis of intergroup violence it is possible to understand the role of this violence in the evolution of international conflict.¹³⁹ For example, as groups evolved through stages, according to Jones and Skinner, group identity increased and subsequently the level of conflict also increased. Extrapolating this premise to the realities of transnational actors acting out in the global political arena, Susanne Rudolph argues that these actors offer a certain sub-national group identity that in some instances supercedes that of states.¹⁴⁰

Historically, analyzing the causes of conflict facilitated as political violence helps in accomplishing the daunting task of defining terrorism. By initially defining terrorism as an intrinsically political act, this study can begin the task of delineating the differences between various types of terrorism. This study identifies two types of terrorism: state terrorism and non-state terrorism. The latter is the major focus of this study because it reflects the political violence of transnational organizations such as al Qaeda.

¹³⁹ Peter Jones and Andrew S. Skinner, *Adam Smith Reviewed* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 174-188 passim.

¹⁴⁰ Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, ed., introduction to *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, ed. James P. Piscatoi (Boulder: Westview Press/A Division of Harper Collins, 1997), 1-19 passim.

Michael Stohl characterizes state terrorism in *The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression*.¹⁴¹ Stohl characterizes the role of the state in facilitating political violence and defines the concept of state terrorism as the use of terrorism by state actors in the pursuit of "domestic and international interests."¹⁴²

While the concept of state terrorism is an important element in an understanding of terrorism, transnational terrorism is the focus of this study. Carol C. Dorsch and Glenn E. Schweitzer characterize transnational terrorism as an escalation in the nature and strategy of terrorist attacks, including cyber-terrorism.¹⁴³ In their book, *Super Terrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Dorsch and Schweitzer suggest that transnational terrorist activities in some instances involve various criminal activities such as money laundering and illegal arms transactions.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, in *The New Terrorism*, by Walter Laqueur, the author adds the deployment of chemical and biological agents to the list of methods used by transnational terrorists.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ Michael Stohl, "International Dimensions of State Terrorism," in *The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression*, ed. Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), 44.

¹⁴² Ibid., 3.

¹⁴³ Carol C. Dorsch and Glenn E. Schweitzer, *Super Terrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Plenum, 1998), 19-20.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 17-19.

¹⁴⁵ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 67.

The expansion of the methods and techniques of non-state terrorists has forced state actors to reevaluate their approach to the counter-terrorism measures that they take. David Tucker notes in his book, entitled *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism*, the importance of the U.S. confronting terrorism if it intends to maintain and extend its hegemonic dominance of international relations.¹⁴⁶ This reference identifies the importance of defining terrorism in a practical way as a basis for combating it.¹⁴⁷ Additionally, Tucker provides a case study of U.S. involvement in Bosnia and discusses an increase in Islamic based global terrorism against the U.S.

Another scholar, Richard K. Betts, posits a theory of terrorism in which he argues that the strategy of transnational terrorists is to use the overwhelming power of dominant state actors like the U.S. as a “tactical advantage”¹⁴⁸ for the purpose of initiating a power struggle against them. In his article “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,” Betts points out that political violence in the form of terrorism involves a strategy designed to compete against the overwhelming power of the U.S.¹⁴⁹ This idea of terrorism as a power achieving mechanism designed to compete with the overwhelming power of the U. S. is further reflected in Claes G. Ryn’s analysis in

¹⁴⁶ David Tucker, *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), 51-53.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹⁴⁸ Richard K. Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,” *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (2002): 19.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

“Dimensions of Power: The Transformation of Liberalism and the Limits of ‘Politics.’”¹⁵⁰

Ryn attempts to show that the character of terrorist acts carried out by transnational organizations is an attempt to compete within its limited dimensions of power against more powerful actors.¹⁵¹

The relationship between competition for political power and terrorism is the key to understanding political violence such as the September 11 attacks. In *Black Power Ideologies: An Essay in African-American Political Thought*, John T. McCartney outlines the nature of political power and the competition for it.¹⁵² This source is used in the present study to conceptualize power by looking at the way subordinate groups view power acquisition when faced with overwhelming force from a dominant power structure.¹⁵³ In a similar vein, Patricia Seed provides a definition for power applicable to this study by “recognizing other less official vectors of power.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ Claes G. Ryn “Dimensions of Power: The Transformation of Liberalism and the Limits of ‘Politics’,” *Humanitas* 13, no. 2 (2000): 4.

¹⁵¹ I bid.

¹⁵² John T. McCartney, *Black Power Ideologies: An Essay in African-American Political Thought* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 120.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Patricia Seed, “More Colonial and Postcolonial Discourses,” *Latin American Research Review* 28 (1993): 147.

Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda represents a weaker political actor attempting to compete within its limited dimensions of power against a dominant actor (the U.S.). Placed within a Hobbesian framework, this conception provides the basis for understanding the causes of terrorist acts such as the September 11 attacks. Terrorism has provided the mechanism for al Qaeda to emerge as a major political actor and to accomplish some of its stated goals. In the article "al Qaeda (The Base)," author John Pike defines the nature, character, objectives, and goals of the al Qaeda network.¹⁵⁵ The article, "Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on America – al Qa'ida," from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, also provides an outline of the al Qaeda network.¹⁵⁶ These articles were used in this study to identify the history, goals, and objectives of the al Qaeda organization and the role of the principals of "Shariah, or Islamic law" as a basis of the ideology of al Qaeda.¹⁵⁷

Likewise, the article "Al-Qaida: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, United States Department of State, April 2003," available from the Terrorist Group Profiles of the Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School, was useful in identifying the pattern of

¹⁵⁵ John Pike, "al-Qa'ida (The Base)," [on-line resource] (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, accessed 30 April 2003); available from <http://www.fas.org/irp.world/para/ladin.htm>; Internet.

¹⁵⁶ Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on America: Al-Qaida," [on-line resource] (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002, accessed 8 August 2002); available from <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/alqaida.htm>; Internet.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

rhetoric initiated by al Qaeda.¹⁵⁸ This article focuses on and was used in the present study to illustrate the history, goals, and objectives of al Qaeda.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, this database provides relevant information and statistics on terrorist groups and terrorist acts, including the September 11 attacks.¹⁶⁰

In a like manner, Jane Corbin outlines the origins of al Qaeda and points out that the Afghanistan War has not significantly decreased the threat of al Qaeda sponsored terrorism.¹⁶¹ Corbin provides a very limited analysis of the causes of al Qaeda sponsored terrorism, ignoring the historical realities of Western colonialism and the state-of-war conditions prevalent in international relations. Rohan Gunaranta, on the other hand, provides a more balanced analysis of the causes of terrorist acts perpetuated by al Qaeda.¹⁶² In addition, Gunaranta illustrates a well-documented outline of the origins of

¹⁵⁸ Dudley Knox Library - Terrorist Group Profiles, "Al-Qaida: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002: United States Department of State, April 2003," [on-line resource] (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 2003, accessed 30 April 2003); available from <http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/qaida.htm>; Internet.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Jane Corbin, *Al-Qaida: The Terror Network that Threatens the World* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press / Nation Books, 2002), 26-29.

¹⁶² Rohan Gunaranta, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, a Division of Penguin Group, 2002), 115-118.

al Qaeda and its goals and objectives.¹⁶³ Similarly, the book *Through Our Enemies' Eyes* outlines the goals and objectives of al Qaeda.¹⁶⁴ Correspondingly, in *Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror*, Paul Williams also identifies the goals and objectives of al Qaeda.¹⁶⁵

One of the major elements contributing to the success of al Qaeda's facilitation of its goals and objectives is the nature of its financial network as Cindy Combs, in *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, identifies.¹⁶⁶ Additionally, Adam Cohen, in "How bin Laden Funds His Network," points out the role of "Hawala" in the facilitation of the financing of al Qaeda's goals.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, in the journal article "Usama bin Laden: the Nature of the Challenge," Michael Collins Dunn provides an outline of the role of Osama (or Usama) bin Laden's leadership in facilitating the financing of al Qaeda's stated goals and objectives.¹⁶⁸ Dunn also outlines the history of the al Qaeda

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc., 2002), 4.

¹⁶⁵ Paul Williams, *Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror* (USA: Alpha-A Pearson Education Co., 2002), 3-7.

¹⁶⁶ Cindy C. Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2003).

¹⁶⁷ Adam Cohen, "How bin Laden Funds His Network," *Time*, 1 October 2001, 63.

¹⁶⁸ Michael Collins Dunn, "Usama bin Laden: the Nature of the Challenge," *Journal of Middle East Policy* 6, no. 26 (1998): 23-26.

network and explains how bin Laden came to create the organization.¹⁶⁹ In addition, Dunn points out attempts by the Clinton Administration to assassinate bin Laden during the American military strikes on August 20, 1998, in the Khowst and North Khartoum regions of Afghanistan.¹⁷⁰ By making attempts on bin Laden's life, the U. S. may have conceivably exacerbated the conflict and provided al Qaeda further motivation to carry out terrorist acts against America, its interests, allies, and client states.

Manifestations of al Qaeda's Terrorist Attacks

Did al Qaeda, in its attempt to carry out political violence inside the borders of the U.S., initiate other manifestations that the organization did not anticipate? Themes within some of the relevant literature reflect some important political manifestations that emerged out of the attacks. Some of these manifestations are represented in the foreign policy initiatives taken by the G. W. Bush Administration after the attacks. What have been the results of these initiatives? For one, a significant amount of world opinion outside the U.S. is that many of these initiatives have increased the state-of-war conditions in the international political arena.¹⁷¹ For example, the article "Poll: Israel and U.S.: Major Threats to World Peace" cites foreign public opinion polls that identify

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Democracy Now, "Poll: Israel and U.S. Major Threats to World Peace," [online resource] (New York: Democracy Now On-Line, 31 October 2003, accessed 7 November 2003); available from <http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=03/10/31/15232230>; Internet.

America and Israel as posing the most severe threats to world peace.¹⁷² Historically, one of the major issues facing the U.S. in terms of its relations with Arab Muslims has been its support for Israel.¹⁷³ In the article "Palestinians Mark Anniversary with a Promise to Fight" Atef Sa'ad gives one example of this by illustrating the point that the U.S. has largely financed the Israeli occupation of Palestine.¹⁷⁴ Correspondingly, in "A Conservative Total for U.S. Aid to Israel: \$91 Billion—and Counting" Shirl McArthur states that U.S. aid to Israel has been excessive compared to aid given to Arab states.¹⁷⁵ Additionally, the book *Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice* provides an historical, descriptive analysis of U.S. involvement in the state-of-war conditions comprising the Israeli and Palestinian conflict.¹⁷⁶ Such realities serve the rhetorical aims

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Atef Sa'ad, "Palestinians Mark Anniversary with a Promise to Fight," [on-line newspaper] (Bombay: *Indian Express*, 29 September 2003, accessed 16 October 2003); available from www.indianexpress.com; Internet.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Shirl McArthur, "A Conservative Total for U.S. Aid to Israel: \$91 Billion—and Counting," (Washington: *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, [on-line periodical] January/February 2001, accessed 4 October 2002); available from <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/010201/0101015.html>; Internet.

¹⁷⁶ John Quigley, *Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice* (Duram, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 3-6.

¹⁷⁹ Jamie York, *A Coup D'etat for Big Oil*, (New Humanist [on-line periodical] (Common Dreams, accessed 2 August 2003); available from <http://www.newhumanist.com/coup.html>; Internet.

of al Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalists by allowing them to point to the Palestinian situation as an example, in their opinion, of U.S. determination to repress Arab Muslims.

Since September 11, 2001, the G. W. Bush Administration has continued to facilitate policy initiatives that would have been next to impossible without the fear created by the attacks. Specifically, Jamie York argues that the September 11 attacks provided the impetus for the Bush Administration to carry out two preemptive wars (in Afghanistan and Iraq) and establish a military presence in the oil-rich Middle Eastern region.¹⁷⁷ Additionally, York posits that a significant amount of these policies was effectively in the interest of the oil industry.¹⁷⁸ This article is used to argue that the Bush Administration characterizes the “terrorists” as “evil doers” in an attempt to use such rhetoric to push its hegemonic foreign policy agenda.¹⁷⁹

Jim Lobe points out that even though the September 11 attacks provided the impetus for the Bush Administration to facilitate certain foreign policy initiatives, many of these initiatives were in the planning stages as far back as the early 1990s.¹⁸⁰ For example, the neo-conservative think tank, Project for a New American Century (PNAC), which involved several high-ranking members of the G. W. Bush Administration, called

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Jim Lobe, “Bush's Foreign Policy Blueprint: A Grand Global Plan,” [on-line journal] (Washington D.C.: *Tom Paine Common Sense: A Public Interest Journal*, 26 March 2002, accessed 7 July 2003); available from <http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/5345>; Internet.

for many of the foreign policy initiatives taken by this Administration after the September 11 attacks as far back as 1998.¹⁸¹

According to the G. W. Bush Administration, the foreign policy initiatives taken after the September 11 attacks were necessary, due to the subsequent state-of-war conditions that prevailed. These conditions led the Bush Administration to initiate policies that were similar to the domestic national security policies initiated by the Roosevelt Administration during World War II.¹⁸² The court case of *Hirabayashi v. United States* provided the basis for executive orders issued by the Roosevelt Administration in 1943.¹⁸³ This case designated military sectors and established the War Relocation Department that was responsible for detaining individuals who could potentially be a threat to national security.¹⁸⁴ The executive orders and legislative policies that were based on this case provided justification for the Bush Administration to facilitate similar policies after the September 11 attacks.¹⁸⁵ According to Timothy Lynch,

¹⁸¹ Project for a New American Century, "Letter to Bill Clinton," [on-line resource] (Washington, D.C.: Project for a New American Century, 26 January 1998, accessed 3 October 2003; and "Letter to George W. Bush," 21 Sept 2001, accessed 3 October 2003); available from <http://newamericancentury.org/Clintonletter.htm>; Internet.

¹⁸² *Hirabayashi v. United States*, 320 U.S. 81 no. 870, [on-line database] (U.S. Supreme Ct. 1943, reproduced in FindLaw 1994, accessed 13 June, 2003); available from <http://laws.findlaw.com/us/320/81.html>; Internet.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Timothy Lynch, "Patriotic Questions: Addressing the Patriot Act," [on-line periodical] (*National Review*, 21 August 2003, accessed 30 November 2002); available from <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-lynch082103.asp>; Internet.

individuals designated as detainees by the G. W. Bush Administration may be transferred out of the country at any time, are not allowed to file a writ of habeas corpus, and may be prosecuted in a military tribunal.¹⁸⁶ This reference is used in the present study to identify the breath of powers extended to the executive branch of the U.S. government after September 11, 2001.

Summarizing Statements

In summary, this review reflects the nature of the relevant literature in terms of addressing the major concerns of this study. Specifically, the breadth of the literature (as relevant this study) encompasses works related to international relations in terms of the role of the state in causing and/or limiting global political violence, the realist concept of anarchy in the international state of nature, and Hobbes's theory of the state of nature and the social contract as it relates to the egoistic tendency of humans toward violent conflict. Additionally, this chapter provides a summary of some of the relevant literature regarding the nature of political violence and the special character of terrorism as political violence. Lastly, this review reflects a brief summary of the literature regarding al Qaeda, its goals, objectives, and role in the facilitation of terrorist acts such as the September 11 attacks.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

HOBBS'S CONCEPT OF THE EGOISTIC STATE OF NATURE AS A CAUSE OF VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT

This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of Hobbes's political philosophy as it is outlined in *Leviathan* for the purpose of investigating what motivates individuals to engage in political violence and conflict. Secondly, the chapter examines Hobbes's conception of the egoistic nature of individuals, the state of nature, and the social contract as areas of concern. These areas are delineated in order to provide in the following chapter the foundation for the development of an inference regarding the relationship between the above-stated aspects of Hobbes's political philosophy and the causes of the September 11 attacks. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a critical analysis of Hobbesian political philosophy, exploring the many logical and practical aspects of his theory, or to point out the rational inconsistencies in its structure. It also does not seek to discuss specifically the September 11 attacks or al Qaeda, but, rather, it seeks to provide an overview of the relevant Hobbesian concepts that will be used in Chapter 4 in exploring the stated central research problem of this study.

Social scientists have utilized Hobbes's approach to the study of violence and conflict because his model provides an answer to the following question: What is the relationship of the egoistic tendencies (the pursuit of self-interest, obsession with self-preservation, glorification, and an endless desire to be the master over other individuals'

lives and properties) prevalent in human nature to the causes of the hostilities present in international relations which, themselves, can be described as reflections of a state of nature? Ultimately, the Hobbesian theory of the state of nature, characterized by an absence of civil authority, may serve as a way to allow powerful individuals or actors to dominate others and dictate that others yield to their specific self-interests. In order to facilitate a clear understanding of these concerns, it is best that we begin such a critique by exploring the egoistic component of Hobbes's state of nature.

Hobbes's Theory of Egoism

Hobbes's conception of egoism is based on the application of relativism to human nature.¹ More specifically, his ethical theory regarding morality, right and wrong, and good and bad is based on an egoistically based moral relativism.² It is important to note this element of Hobbes's philosophy in reference to the concerns of this study as well as the following ethical question: When is it "wrong" to use acts of political violence in the pursuit of self-interests? Implicit in Hobbes's theory is the fact that a subjective question such as this is open to interpretation and, therefore, is morally relative. From this beginning position, "Hobbes had both stated and explained moral relativism: there were no objective moral properties, but what seemed good was what pleased any individual or was good for him."³ Thus, there is no absolute truth as to what is good or bad or right or

¹Richard Tuck, *Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1989), 55.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

wrong. These determinations are simply the judgments of the observer. It is the relativist nature of what individuals deem as good and pleasurable (as well as the relative means of achieving these good and pleasurable ends, facilitated in actions), which leads to conflict.⁴

Within the above stated conception of moral relativism, as applied to the facilitation of political violence, the following question arises: When are acts of political violence against non-combatant civilian targets morally permissible? For example, was it morally permissible (i.e., good) for the Allied Forces during World War II to knowingly bomb and kill German civilian noncombatants in order to destroy a murderous and hostile regime that destabilized Europe and was perceived by many as “bad?” In this instance, were the bombings “good” because they destroyed a perceived “bad” regime? Likewise, if the al Qaeda network perceives U.S. foreign policy as “bad,” are they then morally “right” to attack and kill American citizens/noncombatants in political violence facilitated as terrorist attacks? Certainly, most American citizens would answer no to this question. However, many Germans who were bombed during the Allied air raids of World War II would conceivably say that the Allies were not morally “right” to kill civilians/noncombatants and that these were “bad” or immoral actions. This example illustrates the relative nature of morality when it is applied to acts of political violence.

The relative nature of moral concerns as a basis for determining good consequences is perceived as being equivalent to the pursuit of self-interest in Hobbesian

⁴Ibid.

theory.⁵ More specifically, Hobbes would argue that moral perceptions are simply reflections of self-interest.⁶ Ultimately, at a minimum, individuals perceive that what is “good” is in their best self-interest.⁷ In the examples above of the actions of the Allied forces in World War II and of al Qaeda in the present, each designation of what is “good” and “bad” is based on perceived self-interest. The Allies, in an attempt to destroy the Third Reich, saw the necessity of bombing civilian targets, as it was in their own collective interests to do so. Conversely, German civilians who were being injured and killed perceived these actions as “bad” because they were in opposition to their collective interests. Certainly, no sane collective group of individuals would consider being bombed continuously in the type of massive air campaign that was facilitated by the Allies as being in their best self-interests.

The desires to acquire what is good (as represented in self-interested behavior and the motivation toward self-preservation) are characterized by Hobbes as passions.⁸ If individuals cannot preserve themselves, then all other self-interested goals are meaningless. Correspondingly, Hobbes’s perspective implies that humans naturally sense that powerful passions are directly related to their continued existence, which is the

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., 54.

⁷Ibid., 54-55.

⁸Ibid., 55.

most basic self-interested passion.⁹ Therefore, individuals have strong passions for what they deem good and in their own self-interest. Thus, the natural instinct toward self-interest is pervasive in self-preservation. Ultimately, self-interest is seen as good. Individuals naturally desire to take actions that will lead to good results. Because individuals naturally desire good consequences, they will consistently strive to take actions that they perceive will lead to these consequences. Resultantly, specific actions are perceived by individuals as being in their own self-interests and, therefore, as contributing to their preservation.¹⁰ Therefore, passions will lead individuals toward behaviors that will best serve their interests.¹¹ The blatant pursuit of self-interest is a passion and, as such, is a survival technique used in conditions wherein everyone pursues his/her own narrow, or individually defined, best interest as he/she sees fit. According to Hobbes's perspective, "everyone acts solely for himself, dominated by the passion for self-preservation."¹²

This view is also present in the writings of Spinoza.¹³ Spinoza points out that the

⁹Ibid., 54.

¹⁰Ibid., 55.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²T. E. Jessop, *Thomas Hobbes* (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1960), 18-19.

¹³Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1899), 201.

“tendency to self-preservation is a characteristic of all beings.”¹⁴ Therefore, it is meaningless to condemn individuals for pursuing their own self-preservation or even what they perceive as good.¹⁵ Echoing this view, Hobbes writes the following:

Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuses man’s nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions that proceed from those Passions, . . .¹⁶

In the above quote, Hobbes suggests that it is natural for individuals to pursue what is in their perceived self-interests. The role of natural desires and motivations is a constant theme in Hobbesian philosophy.¹⁷ Hobbes describes the natural tendencies, emotions, desires, and motivations of individuals as aspects of the human appetite.¹⁸ Human appetite represents the animal nature of individuals. Humans, as opposed to animals, however, can rationalize and devise strategies designed to serve their interests.¹⁹ Thus, human appetite is fueled by reason and rationally applied to the infinite, self-

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Thomas Van Hobbes, *Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Forme & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill*, ed. Alfred Rayney Waller (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1904), 63.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 8-9.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

interested motivations of individuals and their perceptions of what is good. Human appetite is also a dominant motivation for the acquisition of power.²⁰ Hobbes states the following regarding power:

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.²¹

Toward that end, Strauss points out that “the clearest and most perfect expression for the naturalistic conception of human appetite is the proposition that man desires power and ever greater power, spontaneously and continuously.”²² This desire for power may be irrational (consisting of purely animal appetite) or “rational” (consisting of logical cerebration).²³ Furthermore, an individual’s pursuit of power represents an obsession, one that can only be contained through the predominance of superior power.²⁴ According to Strauss, the rational striving for the acquisition and maintenance of power is perceived as being in an individual’s self-interest.²⁵ Individuals seek power because it is

²⁰Ibid., 10-11.

²¹Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 63.

²²Strauss, 10-11.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

natural, and because they perceive power as good. By definition, if it is good, then it is in an individual's best self-interest.

Beyond this motivation for power, individuals seek to provide for their own preservation by instilling fear in other individuals and demanding obedience from other individuals as a means to an end of self-preservation and the pursuit of self-interests.²⁶ However, Hobbes tells us that some individuals pursue power beyond the point needed for their individual survival:

[Additionally,] . . . because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defense, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a man's conservation; it ought to be allowed him.²⁷

Humans, by nature, are power hungry. Hobbes conceptualizes that the pursuit of power is intrinsically tied to self-interest and self-preservation. However, it is these egoist tendencies that lead to the conditions prevalent in the state of nature.

Hobbes's Egoistic State of Nature

It is the above-stated egoistically based moral relativism that Hobbes uses to infer a resulting set of varying circumstances that would lead to a state of nature where humans live in their 'natural conditions.'²⁸ This is further conceptualized by Hobbes as the

²⁶Russell Hardin, *Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 550.

²⁷Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 83.

²⁸Jessop, 18-19.

absence of civil authority represented by the lack of sufficient political organization.²⁹ It is this lack of sufficient political organization combined with the natural egoistic condition of individuals that leads to the conditions that result in the state of nature.³⁰ According to Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war.³¹ As a result, self-interest may be sought at the expense of any other individuals and/or their interests. As proof of this conceptualization, Hobbes points out the following:

Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knowes there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his doores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words?³²

In Hobbes's view, by observing constants in human behavior that exist in societies with civil authority and simultaneously applying those observable constants of human behavior to potential conditions absent of civil authority, it is possible to reach his conclusions regarding the egoistic state of nature. By qualifying these observable facts in specific terms, reasoning will lead to the realization that people are inherently egoistic and obsessed with self-preservation even in conditions consisting of established political order. If people behave this way in politically organized societies, then in conditions

²⁹Ibid., 18.

³⁰Hardin, 550.

³¹Ibid.

³²Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 84.

absent of civil authority, the circumstances would definitively be like that found in a state of nature. Hobbes posits that to locate evidence that people are naturally this way; individuals should simply look within themselves and determine their own nature through a self-evaluation.³³ Through their own rational self-evaluations individuals infer an understanding of the true nature of people in general. Specifically, Hobbes points out “that wisdom is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men.”³⁴ In other words, it is imperative in the attempt to understand human nature that individuals exercise the doctrine “Nosce teipsum” (read thy self).³⁵ Individuals have self-contained experimental models within themselves, and individuals should rationalize inductively from the specific to the general in order to determine human nature. By looking at their own individual passions and desires, people can reason to conclusions regarding human nature in general. Hobbes’s position is that all individuals have the same natural egoistic emotions and motivations.

Based on these conceptualizations, Hobbes discerns what rights individuals would have in this state of nature. In the state of nature behavior is unrestrained and individuals are within their rights to do anything they deem necessary in the pursuit of their self-interest.³⁶ In Hobbes’s view, egoistic tendencies, such as the unabated pursuit of self-

³³Ibid., xix-xx.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Jessop, 18.

interest and the desire for power, are natural tendencies. As natural tendencies they are conceptualized as “rights.”³⁷ In conditions characteristic of the state of nature, it is meaningless to speak of a natural human instinct that is not a “right.” Hobbes argues that what people perceive as “good” is in their self-interest, and is essential to self-preservation. The actions taken by individuals in the pursuit of these goals are natural rights that all people have in the absence of civil authority. Because it is natural (i.e., instinctive for people) to pursue their own self-preservation, it is their natural right to do so. Hobbes points out that “it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one anothers body.”³⁸ As stated earlier, Hobbes posits that this natural pursuit of self-interest and self-preservation is partly undertaken through the use of reason and is partly rational in nature.³⁹ This natural right grows out of the natural innate instinct of appetite and the “rational striving for power.”⁴⁰

The striving for power also has another dimension. If one individual has the ability to gain dominion over others through the acquisition and maintenance of power, then that individual has the right to do so within a state of nature.⁴¹ Hobbes states, “The right of nature, which writers commonly call *Jus Naturale* [*sic*], is the Liberty each man

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Tuck, 93.

⁴⁰Strauss, 10.

⁴¹Ibid.

hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”⁴²

Beyond the desire for power and the playing out of natural egoistic tendencies in the state of nature, Hobbes identifies three causes of “quarrel” (“competition,” “diffidence” and “glory”) that are essential parts of the state of nature.⁴³ The following illustrates the bases for these three causes of quarrel:

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens[sic] persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe [sic] of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.⁴⁴

The first cause of quarrel, competition, is centered in the natural appetite of man, consisting of the continual pursuit of power⁴⁵ and a struggle for limited resources.⁴⁶ Competition and a struggle for limited resources are somewhat congruent with the

⁴²Hobbes, 86.

⁴³Ibid., 83.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., 63.

⁴⁶Ibid., 82.

Darwinian evolutionary theory of natural selection⁴⁷ and of the population theory⁴⁸ of Malthus. In evolutionary theory species are in competition with one another for limited resources. A brief, simplistic version of this theory follows below:

1. "Organisms produce far more offspring than required to maintain their population sizes, and yet their population sizes generally remain more or less constant over long periods of time. From this fact, as well as from observation, it seems clear that there is a high rate of mortality among immature individuals.
2. Individuals in any population show much variation, and those that survive do so to a large extent because of their particular characteristics. That is, individuals with certain characteristics can be considered better adapted to their particular environments.
3. Since offspring resemble their parents closely, though not exactly, successive generations will maintain and improve on the degree of adaptation by gradual changes in each generation."⁴⁹

Extended into the political, social and economic realms, these ideas have been coined Social Darwinism or social imperialism and they flow from the conceptualizations of Kidd, Spencer, and Pearson.⁵⁰ The theories of Adam Smith also reflect and focus on the

⁴⁷Bernard Campbell, *Human Ecology: The Story of Our Place in Nature from Prehistory to the Present* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995), 5.

⁴⁸T. R. Malthus, *Parallel Chapters from the First and Second Editions of An Essay on the Principle of Population* (New York: Macmillan, 1895), 9.

⁴⁹Campbell, 5.

⁵⁰Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-1914*, ed. Ruth and David Glass (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1960), 29-32.

element of competition.⁵¹ The conceptions of Adam Smith and Social Darwinism both emphasize the natural order of life and the role of competition as main variables in the causes of quarrel and conflict. Darwin is credited with being one of the founders of “scientific naturalism,” and Hobbes is credited with being the father of “ethical naturalism.”⁵² Hobbes is credited as such because his view of the pursuit of self-preservation corresponds to the ideas contained in ethical naturalism.⁵³ In terms of Malthusian theory, “population, when unchecked, increased in a geometrical ratio; and subsistence for man in an arithmetical ratio.”⁵⁴ Malthus goes on, perhaps unwittingly, to support Hobbes’s basic premise:

All cannot share alike the bounties of nature. Were there [is] no established administration of property, every man would be obliged to guard with force his little store. Selfishness would be triumphant. The subjects of contention would be perpetual. Every individual mind would be under a constant anxiety about corporal support; [*sic*] and not a single intellect would be left free to expatiate in the field of thought.⁵⁵

The second cause of quarrel identified by Hobbes is diffidence. Diffidence is defined by Hobbes as fear and mistrust that others desire what one has, including

⁵¹Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. C. J. Bullock (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1909), 39.

⁵²Reginald A. P. Rogers, *A Short History of Ethics, Greek and Modern* (London: Macmillan, 1911), 257.

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴Malthus, 9.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

possibly one's life and is based on the conceptualization that individuals are relatively equal in their abilities to compete against each other.⁵⁶ In the state of nature humans are naturally and relatively equal, both mentally and physically, insofar as even the weakest person has the strength to kill the strongest.⁵⁷ One individual may be stronger than another, but the weaker individual may be smarter and therefore able to defeat the stronger individual through superior intelligence, conspiracy with others, deceit, trickery, or prudence.⁵⁸ Hobbes's philosophy, therefore, defines equality as an individual's natural and relative ability to pursue their self-interest verses another individual's relative ability to do the same. This equality is what breeds diffidence.⁵⁹ According to Hobbes, based on this condition of "diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself."⁶⁰ The empirical realization and recognition by individuals that all other individuals have the same fear, mistrust and timidity as themselves, leads to escalating conflict in the state of nature. Consequently, if individual "A" looks within herself, then she will see a naturally diffident, fearful entity prepared to do anything to preserve her preservation and ensure the realization of her perceived self-interest. Therefore, through inductive reasoning, individual "A" automatically assumes that everyone else has the

⁵⁶Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 82.

⁵⁷Russell, 550.

⁵⁸Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 82.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

same fears as she has. Based on this reasoning, individual “A” has a mistrust of all other individuals, and based on the same rationale, all other individuals have a mistrust of individual “A.” Ultimately, everyone has a mistrust of everyone else, and this mistrust is based on fear and recognition that everyone has the same reservations towards one another.

This equality of ability is such that individuals have the perception that they naturally have the capabilities to pursue their interests in the same manner as other individuals.⁶¹ Hobbes explains this concept in the following way:

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.⁶²

Ultimately, the realities of equality and diffidence would reasonably lead rational actors in a state of nature to reason in the following manner: What is the most secure plan of action to protect my interests considering the obvious conditions? If individuals in the state of nature place this question within a rational framework, then they may, in some instances, come up with the idea of preemption or prevention.⁶³ Preemption is the

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Robert R. Leonhard and James R. McDonough, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 154-156.

process of undertaking a “first strike attack”⁶⁴ against a perceived threat. The right to do anything that an individual deems rational and necessary to preserve one’s life and limb includes the perceived inherent right to carry out preemptive strikes against other individuals or groups who may be perceived as a threat, even if that individual or group is, in reality, not a threat. Since other individuals are perceived and assumed to be a threat, an individual carries out preemptive strikes against others to conceivably get rid of or reduce that perceived threat. A first strike preemptive scenario may be perceived by the first individual as essential to the protection of life and property. This scenario can be rationalized in the following way:

1. It is my (the first individual’s) natural right to protect my life, property, and pursuit of my pleasure by any means that I see fit.
2. Based on my inductive rationalization of the true nature of people and the subsequent state of nature that exists in a society with no civil authority, I am in perpetual fear of being attacked by others, and it is within my rights to rationally decide to attack them before they attack me.
3. Under these conditions, why should I ever endeavor toward peace at all or cease my preemptive or preventive attacks when others are perpetually rationalizing the state-of-nature conditions in the same manner as I am?
4. If I decide to endeavor toward peace to the degree that I expect others to, then others may in effect carry out preemptive attacks on me since it is well within their rights to do so.
5. Until there is an ultimate power that can protect me from these threats and guarantee the protection of my life and interests, I will continue these preemptive strikes.

⁶⁴Stephen J. Cimbala, *First Strike Stability: Deterrence after Containment* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 29.

Consequently, preemption leads to more fear and diffidence and this diffidence “broadens into a general cupidi, in some crowned with a passion for prestige.”⁶⁵ This passion for prestige, or glorification, simply heightens the state-of-war conditions in the state of nature. Hobbes defines glorification as “joy, arising from the imagination of [one’s] . . . own power and ability.”⁶⁶ The motivation toward glorification is also viewed as contributing to the acquisition and maintenance of the reputation of an individual.⁶⁷ In Hobbes’s view, “a good reputation (is) . . . commendable.”⁶⁸

Implicit in this argument regarding the acquisition of glory, as it relates to the maintenance of reputations, is an explanation of the circumstances that lead to individuals practicing cruelty toward one another.⁶⁹ According to Hobbes, individuals in a state of nature view their respective self-interests as being directly related to how much cruelty could be dealt out to other individuals.⁷⁰ An individual’s powerful reputation may be enhanced by developing a reputation for practicing cruelty toward others, which, in essence, sends the message “don’t threaten or attack me.” Consequently, this could

⁶⁵Jessop, 18-19.

⁶⁶Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 33.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 34-35.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 35.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

potentially have a self-preservation benefit for individuals in the state of nature. Hobbes explains that “contempt or little sense of the calamity of others is that which men call cruelty.”⁷¹ This represents a twisted zero-sum gain scenario where one individual’s well-being is seen as being affected by another’s ability to deal out cruelty.⁷² Additionally, the bad fortune of some is perceived as a gain for the self-interest of others.

For example, if individual “A’s” actions directly or indirectly cause or contribute to individual “B’s” losses, then individual “A” may see this as a gain. Conversely, if individual “B” gains something, then individual “A” may view “B’s” gain as a loss, even if what “B” gained was something that could not, in any tangible way, lead to a gain or a loss for “A.”

Ending the Egoistic State of Nature through the Hobbesian Social Contract

In Hobbes’s view the realities that would exist in the state of nature are undeniable truths, and he believes that without any restraint to prevent the egoistic natural instincts of individuals, a state of constant war would exist.⁷³ This constant state of war would be an “enemy to every man” because all individual interests would be in constant jeopardy.⁷⁴ As noted, the pursuit of pleasure, self-interest, power, preservation, and relative equality in the hope of attaining these ends leads to the three principal causes of

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Barbara Arneil, *John Locke and America: The Defense of English Colonialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 145.

⁷³Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 84.

⁷⁴Ibid.

quarrels—competition, diffidence, and the pursuit of glory. These causes or motivations are freely, openly, and rightly pursued by all. It is completely within the rights of all individuals to do so because it is in their nature to pursue their interests. Furthermore, in a state of nature ownership of private property would be tenuous, at best. No one could have complete ownership of anything because everything would be fair game. This condition allows for no person to be secure and thus threatens human existence, as there will always be death attempts made on people's lives if for no other reason than seeking to acquire their material possessions. Hobbes summarizes his view of what human existence would be like in a state of nature:

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live in awe [without sovereign power], they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.⁷⁵

⁷⁵Ibid., 83-84.

These realities lead individuals, as rational beings not acting solely on their animal instincts, to realize that there exists a reality that can be discovered through rational thought. Specifically, Hobbes points out that “consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, that everyman, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it.”⁷⁶ This represents the “first, Fundamental Law of Nature; which is, to seek peace, and follow it.”⁷⁷ The natural right to blatantly express one’s egoistic tendencies, to pursue one’s self-interests unabated, and the right to obtain anything that another person has (i.e., the right to everything), is balanced by means of the fundamental law of nature. This fundamental law requires that even though the right to everything may exist, people should seek peace to the extent that they expect others to seek peace. In this instance a balance is achieved through a distinction between a “law” and a “right”.⁷⁸ In essence, “the former contained restraints necessary to make life secure (and) . . . the latter implied liberty.”⁷⁹

Hobbes’s attempts to use the distinction between rights and laws (i.e., liberties) to explain the seemingly inherent contradiction between the natural right of individuals to do anything they deem necessary and the first, Fundamental Law of Nature, which argues that everyone should endeavor toward peace. One element in this inherent contradiction

⁷⁶Ibid., 87.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Cornelius F. Murphy, “The Grotian Vision of World Order,” *American Journal of International Law* 76 (1982): 484.

⁷⁹Ibid.

refers to a point made earlier in this chapter: Why should any individual endeavor toward peace when he or she inductively realizes, (based on egoistic moralism, diffidence and equality) that every other individual is a potential threat? Hobbes initially addresses this problem by balancing liberty and freedom designated as a “right” with the restraint implied in a “law.” Hobbes’s rationale is as follows: While it is true that individuals naturally possess the “right” to do anything they deem necessary, it is also true that an undeniable law (the first, Fundamental Law of Nature) requires individuals to seek peace if they wish to have “hope of attaining it.” The operative phase here is “hope of attaining it,” because if individual “A” is interested in her own preservation and self-interest, then rationally she will determine that the best way to achieve this is through a compact with other individuals and/or groups that amounts to an enforceable contract.

An enforceable contract--the social contract--becomes an agreement or covenant between rational individuals who concede that relative peace is in everyone’s self-interest as opposed to a constant state of war.⁸⁰ This contract represents the rational pursuit of self-interest through a collective social transaction and is based on the idea of mutual advantage.⁸¹ Mutual advantage “is what one would call a causal generalization of self-interest.”⁸² Mutual advantage, determined through reason, provides the basis for cooperation among self-interested individuals. In other words, it is reason that motivates

⁸⁰Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 89-90.

⁸¹Hardin, 1-3.

⁸²*Ibid.*

individuals to engage in the collective pursuit of mutual advantage.⁸³ Therefore, the basic rationale of mutual advantage leads to all types of cooperative possibilities among individuals, inclusive of the social contract. Hobbes writes the following regarding the concept of the social contract:

The mutual transferring of right is that which men call contract. Signs of contract are either expressed or by inference. Expressed are words spoken with understanding of what they signify: and such words are either of the time present or past . . . or of the future. Signs of inference are sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes . . . of silence; sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action. . . .⁸⁴
For Hobbes the social contract is a mutual agreement among individuals

expressed directly in words or through inference. One example of contracting through inference would be agreeing to the terms of the contract, not through words or signature, but by compliance to it. In Hobbes's view, this basic idea leads to the natural evolution of the social contract from individual "rights" in the state of nature to individual "duties" in civil society.⁸⁵ R. E. Ewin provides an explanation of this evolution:

The [social] contract . . . for societies, then, will be a model called for at the end of Hobbes' argument, in effect summarizing his conclusion; [*sic*] it cannot be the logical starting point of his argument. He will have to show by independent argument that human social life necessarily involves the rights and duties that might lead us to say that even if no actual contract produced this particular society, it could have been a contract that produced it; that is, that the contract is a way of producing this sort of relationship.⁸⁶

⁸³David Gauthier, *Morals by Agreement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 113.

⁸⁴Hobbes, 89.

⁸⁵R. E. Ewin, *Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 21.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*

A social contract is “a basis for legitimate legal and political power in the idea of a contract and further contracts are things that create obligations.”⁸⁷ The concept of the social contract is a stalwart in political philosophy and provides the basis for the existence of civil society.⁸⁸ As Gauthier states, “An impressive array of political philosophers have championed the idea that a social contract, understood as a rational agreement among rational persons, can supply the normative blueprint for an ideally well-ordered society.”⁸⁹ But, what are the conditions necessary for such a contract to be applicable and also create obligations and duties? Toward that end, Sacks feels that “Hobbes speaks of people giving up their rights as a consequence of their own self-preservation where a person sees his own preservation resulting from him giving up his right to all things.”⁹⁰ At the most basic level people are persuaded to do this as a result of “the fear of violence and death.”⁹¹

The fear of violence and death, or the desire for self-preservation is the essential motivation for rational, self-interested individuals to seek a covenant that will also create

⁸⁷Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 354.

⁸⁸Michael Milde, “Unreasonable Foundations: David Gauthier on Property Rights, Rationality, and the Social Contract,” *Social Theory and Practice* 25 (1999): 1.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Jonathan Sacks, “Social Contract or Social Covenant,” *Policy Review* 78 (1996): 1.

⁹¹Ibid.

obligations and duties. According to Hobbes, rational individuals would eventually realize that “liberty and equality are found to be valuable only when they were accompanied by security; [*sic*] and security could be obtained only by . . . (a) surrender of (rights).”⁹² This is the essential element in the Hobbesian social contract. Individuals must agree to give up their right to anything for the relative peace and security of some things. This partial surrender of rights is done purely out of self-interest. This reasoning follows the logic of a cost-benefit analysis wherein the cost of giving up some liberties and rights are exceeded by the relative benefit gained in the probability of conserving one's life, limb, and property. Therefore, self-interest, in the form of cooperation, may take precedence over power acquisition and preemption if individuals can rationally conceive of a relative, direct advantage. Even in a state of nature people will cooperate and share power if it is in their perceived best-interests.⁹³ More specifically, rational individuals will sacrifice a portion of their rights if they reason that they will profit more than they forfeit.⁹⁴ This represents a calculation of rational self-interest that is based on the realization that individuals are “political animals(s).”⁹⁵ Therefore, a requirement for a successful social contract is that any agreement or covenant adopted must rationally show some appreciable, relative, political advantage over the state of nature in order to

⁹²T. V. Smith, *The American Philosophy of Equality* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927), 23.

⁹³Sacks, 54-57.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

⁹⁵*Ibid.*

encourage individuals to give up some rights. Moreover, “it is incumbent on this type of social contract to answer the following question: What theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show that all the duties it recommends are also in the true interest of each individual?”⁹⁶

As noted, in a state of nature everyone would have the natural right to everything, including the right to take another person’s life. However, when a person lays down her natural right for her own self-preservation and self-interest, it is based on the belief that others will do the same.⁹⁷ Hobbes states, “That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.”⁹⁸ Ultimately, for the Hobbesian social contract to work everyone, or at least a majority of individuals, must agree to give up certain rights.

Another motivation for individuals to give up rights and agree to the social contract is the desire to acquire and secure private property and material possessions.⁹⁹ In a state of nature, ownership and maintenance of private property would be tenuous, at

⁹⁶Gauthier, 113.

⁹⁷Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 87.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Y. N. Kly, *The Anti-Social Contract* (Atlanta: Clarity, 1989), 7-8.

best, and impossible at worst. The concept of the protection of material possessions and private property is imperative in contractual theory.¹⁰⁰

The protection of private property is a stalwart in many societies that is based on contractual theory.¹⁰¹ For instance, in the United States, the acquisition and protection of private property is essential to the role of political authority.¹⁰² Moreover, the protection of private property through the legitimizing of political authority via the social contract tended to “appeal to the American historical needs because the enslaved Africans were considered private property.”¹⁰³

Leviathan: The Third Party in the Social Contract

The preceding pages of this chapter focus on the egoistic nature of individuals, equality, diffidence, and the role of the absence of sovereign political authority in what conceivably would be a Hobbesian state of nature. The point has been made that it is the rational pursuit of self-interest and preservation of self that leads individuals to discover that the social contract provides the most logical mechanism to end the state of nature. This agreement is made among individuals and consists of the giving up of certain rights if other individuals agree to do the same. However, the Hobbesian social contract entails a second element. This element involves the transferring of the vacated rights to a third

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 8.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 7-8.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Ibid.

party.¹⁰⁴ This third party agrees to protect the rights that individuals have vacated.¹⁰⁵ This second element of the contract is between a collective group of individuals and a sovereign political authority.¹⁰⁶ The sovereign represents the third party in the social contract and political/civil authority is considered by Hobbes to be established at the point that rights are transferred.¹⁰⁷ Hobbes refers to the sovereign as the *Leviathan*, the common wealth, or the Civitas.¹⁰⁸ The political authority of the Leviathan is exercised through the state apparatus as it exists in its various manifestations. Hobbes specifically defines the scenario of the transferring of rights to a third party as well the role of the state and its relationship to the sovereign in the following way:

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them . . . is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men. . . . This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall . . . as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his Actions in like manner.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 118-119.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶G. D. H. Cole, trans., introduction to *The Social Contract and Discourses*, by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (New York: Dutton, 1950), xxii.

¹⁰⁷Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 119.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 118-119.

The state represents the collective will of individuals transformed and transferred to the power of the sovereign.¹¹⁰ The above passage defines Hobbes's conceptualization of the necessity of the state and the role of the sovereign in the political organization of society. In this scenario the sovereign is empowered through the apparatus of the state to maintain domestic peace and provide for security against foreign invasion.

In Hobbes's view, the creation of the state and sovereign power is synonymous to God's creation of individuals.¹¹¹ Thus, Hobbes characterizes the state as an "artificial man."¹¹² Hobbes points out that "nature, (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World), is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal".¹¹³ Humans imitate God's creation of the human animal through the artificial creation of the state.

Hobbes also contends that there is a second intrinsic relationship between God, nature, man, and the State. God, in creating the natural world, created a process that allowed humans to evolve under certain natural conditions. Therefore, human nature, in its egoistic manifestations, could not have been any different than it is. Thus, if individuals evolved in a specific way based on the process of nature that God initiated and man imitated that same process in creating the State, then is the State, by logical

¹¹⁰Ibid., 119.

¹¹¹Ibid., xviii.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid, xviii.

deduction, a causal product of God and nature? Hobbes states that, “The pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic [the state] were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.”¹¹⁴

Hobbes views the artificial animal, the state, as an entity akin to a large person or a mechanical system such as a watch, wherein each part of the state is comparable to the parts of the body or the mechanisms of the watch.¹¹⁵ This artificial animal consists of various interrelated parts that are connected to the center, or the heart, and are designed to work together toward a specific end.¹¹⁶ The various joints and nerves are connected to the principal part, which is the sovereign.¹¹⁷ The sovereign is the “heart” and, thus, the most important part of the state.¹¹⁸ Moreover, the sovereign is the mechanism that provides “life and motion to the whole body.”¹¹⁹ The joints and nerves are represented in the administrative and bureaucratic structure of the state apparatus, which connects to the

¹¹⁴Ibid., xviii-xix.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., xviii.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

sovereign center and works together to perform the functions of the state.¹²⁰ The sovereign controls and centralizes the various working parts of the state in the same manner that the various springs and wheels operate the functions of a watch or that limbs operate the motions of the human body.¹²¹

The sovereign is the element that allows the state to function.¹²² It is the sovereign that enforces the political order and establishes the moral basis of society.¹²³ Additionally, “moral distinctions become valid only through the alchemy of the sovereign will.”¹²⁴ In the following quote, Hobbes explains how the sovereign gains this power:

The attaining to this Sovereigne Power, is by two ways. One, by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter, may be called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Commonwealth by Institution; and the former, a Commonwealth by Acquisition.¹²⁵

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Ibid., xviii-xix.

¹²³Ibid., 5.

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Ibid., 119.

In the above passage Hobbes categorizes the acquisition of power by the sovereign as being either forcibly acquired or acquired by consent. In the former case, power is taken either through natural force in the form of violence or through the threat of the use of violence.¹²⁶ Concerning the latter, power is given through popular consent, where the majority agrees that an individual or group of individuals be given sovereign power. In this case state power is conferred to the sovereign through the consent of the masses. This consent ultimately provides the rationale for the existence of the state and simultaneously grants the sovereign legitimacy. The sovereign is empowered based on this granting of legitimacy, which itself is founded on the capitulation of the collective appetites of individuals to a higher power. Therefore, the legitimacy of sovereign power is based on popular consent.¹²⁷

The sovereign power, as embodied in the state upon the transference of individual rights, agrees to keep order and protect individuals and their property. It is imperative that the sovereign carries out these responsibilities for the maintenance of its legitimacy and political power.¹²⁸ Toward that end, the following concerns are paramount:

1. Rationally, why would individuals agree to give up certain rights to the sovereign if the sovereign is not obligated to protect certain aspects of those rights?

¹²⁶R. G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan: Or Man, Society, Civilization, and Barbarism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), 179.

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸George Mace, *Locke, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers: An Essay on the Genesis of the American Political Heritage* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), 5-7.

2. One of the motivations for transferring rights to the sovereign power is to better protect one's interests; consequently, individuals reasonably expect, when entering into the social contract, that the sovereign will be obligated to doing this.

3. If the sovereign is not obligated to this and, in fact, does or cannot protect individual interests, then people may be motivated to overthrow that particular sovereign power and replace it with another sovereign power that is capable of protecting their interests.

Beyond these concerns, is the possibility that the state of nature would return and the natural egoistic tendencies of individuals would once again become predominant. In fact, "the sovereign serves the individual's interest so long as he is sovereign in fact and actually wields the power necessary to hold the community together."¹²⁹ Ultimately, people only agree to give up their natural rights if the sovereign agrees to maintain order, defend their interests, and ensure their security beyond what would exist in a state of nature.¹³⁰ Therefore, there is an implicit agreement between individuals and the sovereign. Specifically, social control is facilitated through this agreement between individuals and the sovereign and "this [agreement] will ground the nature of the obligations of each to the other."¹³¹ The contract between the individual and the sovereign presents a social and political context where both are obligated to do certain things. The sovereign is obligated "to defend them [i.e., citizens] from the invasion of

¹²⁹ Murphy, 485.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Blackburn, 354.

foreigners, and the injuries of one another”.¹³² Conversely, individuals are obligated to maintain the contract with other individuals and to abide by the decrees of the sovereign power.¹³³ Hobbes states, “And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted [a]way his right; then he is said to be obliged or bound, not to hinder those [the sovereign power] to whom such right is granted.”¹³⁴ Once the covenant is agreed upon and the transference of rights takes place, sovereign power is considered absolute.¹³⁵ Sovereign power, as it is manifested under the obligations of the social contract, must not be challenged.¹³⁶ Consequently, the sovereign has the right to infringe on the remaining rights and liberties of individuals, with only one exception.¹³⁷ This one exception is the right individuals have to defend themselves.¹³⁸ If the sovereign is unwilling or unable to protect a given individual or group, then that individual or group has the inalienable right to protect itself.

¹³² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 118.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 88.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ Pollock, 295.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

Lastly, for the Hobbesian concept of the social contract to work, particularly in terms of the maintenance of sovereign power, individuals must collectively agree to not only surrender their individual rights to the sovereign, but also the rights of their “descendants.”¹³⁹ As Cole states:

It is clear that, if such a theory is to be upheld, it can stand only by the view, which Hobbes shares with Grotius, that a man can alienate not merely his own liberty, but also that of his descendants, and that, consequently, a people as a whole can do the same.¹⁴⁰

This implication is necessary for the Hobbesian social contract to be valid or have any sustainability. If the transference of rights was based on individual generations, then the sovereign's right to rule and its legitimacy would be called into question in each subsequent generation. As such, the Hobbesian social contract is “irrevocable.”¹⁴¹ Once the initial covenant is made, the contract is considered binding for subsequent generations. Hobbes points out that once the initial contract is initiated there can be no breach of covenant.¹⁴² The sovereign can do no wrong or commit any injustice other than failing to uphold its obligations via the contract.¹⁴³ The reason for this, according to Hobbes, is that due to the collective agreement to transfer rights to the sovereign, every

¹³⁹Cole, xxvi.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Smith, 24.

¹⁴²Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 121.

¹⁴³Ibid., 123.

individual is implicitly responsible for the sovereign's actions.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, not only are the masses subject to whatever actions the sovereign deems necessary, but the masses cannot speak up and accuse the sovereign of any wrong doing because by giving the sovereign state power and ultimately granting legitimacy to the sovereign, they are themselves responsible for the sovereign's actions. This is because the positive consequences of having a sovereign capable of ending the state of nature is more desirable than the negative consequences of having a sovereign whose oppressive actions cannot be limited as long as it maintains its obligation under the social contract to end the state of nature.

But what would be the consequences if a minority of individuals refused to initially transfer their rights to the sovereign, or they subsequently refused to abide by its decrees? Hobbes implies that they would be treated as if they were in the state of nature or as if they were an "enemy" of the state.¹⁴⁵ These individuals would inevitably be seen as violating the basis of the contract and the rules of civil society established by the sovereign, and subsequently, the sovereign would then be obligated to take action against them. Consequently, these individuals would be expelled from the commonwealth, jailed, or possibly killed. The following illustrates this point:

Either you have agreed, he [Hobbes] says, to transfer your power to the sovereign or you have not. If you have, then you are stopped from disputing the acts of the sovereign. If you have not, you declare yourself a

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Pollock, 294.

stranger to the State, and therefore the State has no duties towards you and may treat you as an enemy.¹⁴⁶

Without the social contract and the duties and obligations incumbent on the parties in question, life would be terrible for humans.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, without the state, there could be none of the advantages that state control bring such as civilization, social structure, economic structure, intellectual endeavors, art, or the rights associated with possession of private property.¹⁴⁸ Consequently, Hobbes posits that any system of state control is preferable to the state of nature.¹⁴⁹ Based on this assumption, Hobbes suggests that the sovereign may institute any type of political system it deems necessary as long as it fulfills its obligations under the social contract.¹⁵⁰ As a result, Hobbesian sovereign power may exhibit any character, from the most liberal democracy to the most repressive dictatorship.¹⁵¹ The conditions of the state of nature necessitate the need for the state even if the sovereign authority is repressive or despotic. In other words, “the state of

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 84.

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

¹⁴⁹Smith, 652.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹Ibid., 65.

nature was so unendurable that sheer prudence dictated the acceptance of tyranny from one rather than endure violence from all.”¹⁵²

Summarizing Statements

In conclusion, this chapter establishes the scope of Hobbes’s political philosophy specifically focusing on his conception of the egoistic state of nature. These conceptions are important for understanding the applicability of Hobbes’s ideas as a framework for analyzing the causes of political violence such as the September 11 terrorist attacks.

¹⁵²Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

THE APPLICATION OF HOBBS'S CONCEPT OF THE EGOISTIC STATE OF NATURE TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS

The purpose of this chapter is to show that, in the absence of a global sovereign, the anarchical state-of-war conditions prevalent in international relations resemble the Hobbesian egoistic state of nature and that it is these conditions that breed acts of political violence such as the September 11 terrorist attacks. The natural egoistic tendencies outlined in Chapter 3 are pervasive in individuals. Hobbes notes that in the absence of a sovereign political authority these tendencies would lead to a type of equality that result in the state of nature. Extending these conceptions to international relations, it can be shown that Hobbes's theory (indirectly supported by Machiavelli and Bacon) provides the basis for the proof that a type of international state of nature exists in the global political arena.¹ In essence, the same "law of nature" that applies to relations among individuals applies to relations among political actors acting out in global

¹ Headley Bull, ed., "The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 71-72.

affairs.² Consequently, the noted Hobbesian egoistic behaviors are continually expressed in the political actions that global political actors facilitate in the international political arena. In other words, “Hobbes believed that [political actors] . . . assumed the personal qualities of men.”³

Extending Hobbes’s perspective to the anarchical conditions prevalent in international affairs yields the following observations:

1. There is no international sovereign to restrain political actors from exercising their egoistic behaviors; and,
2. It is probable that at least some human political actors will behave in egoistic ways at least some of the time.

In terms of the former, it is an empirical fact that no international sovereign exists in the global political arena. The United Nations is not an international political authority with global sovereign power.⁴ It is a non-governmental organization (NGO) with an imbalanced distribution of power, with its more powerful member states and

² Suganmi, Hidemi, “Grotius and International Equality,” in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 228.

³ Corneilus Murphy, “The Grotian Vision of World Order,” *American Journal of International Law* 76 (1982): 8.

⁴ Ernest W. Lefever, *The Irony of Virtue: Ethics and American Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 203.

organizations having more authority than its less powerful ones.⁵ In addition, the UN is many times ineffective and inconsistent in its ability to limit violent conflict in the global political arena and does little to circumvent the state-of-nature conditions in it.⁶ The terrorist actions taken by al Qaeda and many of the foreign policy initiatives taken by the G. W. Bush Administration after the September 11 attacks reflect this reality. Specifically, both political actor--al Qaeda and the G.W. Bush Administration--ignore the mandates of the UN and continue to initiate state-of-war actions for the stated goals of either carrying out a war against the "Great Satan," or a "War on Terror," respectively. Both of these stated goals reflect the egoistic tendencies of political actors as they take political actions based on diffidence, conservation, and the pursuit of interests. It is true that human political actors in leadership positions may in some instances behave in a non-egoistic manner. However, one major political act, which is based on egoistic behaviors, could provoke a scenario that leads to devastating political violence that could last for years and resultantly exacerbate the state-of-war conditions already prevalent in the international state of nature. World War I provides one clear illustration of this. Certainly, one of the motivations of imperial Germany in provoking World War I was to add to the glorification of the German state. Glorification is a main Hobbesian egoistic tendency. This tendency toward glorification was pushed forward by an intense nationalism that survived German failure in World War I, resurfaced under the Third

⁵ Ivor Richard Fung, "Organizing Collective Security: African Experiences," in *Bridges to the Future: Prospects for Peace and Security in Southern Africa*, ed. Hans-Joachim Spanger and Peter Vale (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 73.

⁶ Ibid.

Reich, and culminated in World War II.⁷ This example provides an illustration of how the egoistic tendency toward self-glorification can lead to international conflict.

Correspondingly, the noted Hobbesian egoistic tendencies applied to political actors yields the following propositions:

1. If human political actors make the decisions for states (or nation-states) and for political transnational groups and these human political actors are subject to the same egoistic tendencies as everyone else, then it follows that these tendencies are reflected in at least some elements of the decision-making process of these actors;

2. Because states, transnational groups, and other political organizations are controlled and manipulated by human political actors, they take on some of the egoistic characteristics of individuals;

3. In the absence of an international political sovereign with sufficient authority, a set of circumstances are thrust upon human political actors that motivate them to behave as if they were in a Hobbesian state of nature⁸ and;

4. These conceptualizations, placed within the anarchical conditions of global relations, lead to violence within the international state of nature.

⁷Louis Snyder, *German Nationalism: The Tragedy of a People* (Port Washington, New York: Stackpole, 1969), 236.

⁸ Murphy, 483-484.

The Correlation between Hobbes's State of Nature, the International State of Nature, and the Causes of Global Political Violence

Humans in the Hobbesian state of nature and political actors in the international state of nature are both free and have the right to exhibit their natural egoistic tendencies and do anything they deem necessary in pursuit of their perceived interests and conservation.⁹ It is these egoistic tendencies that are facilitated by human political actors and expressed through the political apparatuses of the institutions or organizations that they represent that lead to the conditions in the international state of nature.¹⁰ Additionally, in the absence of an international sovereign, there is no restraint on political actors acting out in the international state of nature beyond the limitations of their respective power capabilities and the imposition from other political actors. Because egoistic tendencies are natural and dominant in the behavior of human political actors and because of the existence of the international state of nature, “international war remains inevitable.”¹¹

However, war is not the only form of political violence carried out in the international state of nature. Non-conventional organized acts of violence, such as the facilitation of terrorist acts, provide mechanisms for less powerful political actors to engage in political violence. In order to understand the relevance of these elements to the causes of political violence, such as the September 11 attacks, it is helpful to infer the

⁹ David P. Fidler and Stanley Hoffmann, ed., introduction to *Rousseau on International Relations*, by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), xlv.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

aforementioned propositions regarding Hobbes's conceptions of the egoistic state of nature and apply them to the state-of-war conditions prevalent in international relations.

Hobbes identifies the international state of nature as follows:

[A condition of anarchy exists where] . . . in all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereign authority, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdoms; and continual Spyes upon their neighbors; wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; which is a posture of War.¹²

The international state of nature is further characterized by a "fragmentation" of solidarity among global political actors.¹³ This fragmentation reflects the individualism of egoistic human behavior as exhibited by human political actors. Based on these realities, the international state of nature, placed within a Hobbesian framework, is a global ordering characterized by a lack of sufficient international political authority and/or definitive international law.¹⁴ In the absence of sufficient global political authority and/or definitive international law, hierarchical political coalitions evolve that reflect the relative power of various actors. Therefore, power politics, in the ultimate sense, is Hobbes's concept of the international state of nature. Implicit in Hobbes's view is the point that there are so many varied political actors interacting in the global arena,

¹² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 85.

¹³ Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles; Or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 323.

¹⁴ Raymond Aron, "The Anarchical Order of Power," *Daedalus* 124 (1995): 27-30.

with competing interests and desires, that this in itself is a cause of violent hostilities.¹⁵

Furthermore, in the absence of an international sovereign authority, the state of war conditions that exist dictate that political violence can conceivably be just and honorable and ultimately in the interests of the state, organization, or group that successfully attacks its competitors.¹⁶

To extend Hobbes's conceptions to the state-of-war conditions that exist in international relations beyond these realities, it is necessary to show that the international state of nature does exist as a real political phenomenon and is related in key ways to the Hobbesian state of nature. Toward that end, Boucher posits that: "Hobbes, in a number of places, invites the comparison of international relations with the unmitigated war of everyman against everyman that is characteristic of the mere state of nature in which Hobbes's individualism is at its most rampant."¹⁷ Accordingly, Dennis Pirages points out that the hostilities of the Hobbesian state of nature are congruent with the hostilities present in the international political arena:

It has long been recognized that international politics is the epitome of the Hobbesian state of nature: despite all the progress over the centuries toward the rule of international law, sovereign states, unlike the citizens within each state, acknowledge no law or authority higher than their own

¹⁵ Murphy, 477.

¹⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive: The Latin Version, Entitled in the First Edition Elementorum Philosophi? Sectio Tertia De Cive*, and in later editions *Elementa Philosophica*, trans. Howard Warrender (Oxford England: Oxford University, 1983), 150.

¹⁷ David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 145.

self-interest; they are therefore free to do as they please, subject only to gross prudential restraints, no matter what the cost to the world community.¹⁸

As noted, in the Hobbesian state of nature individuals have the right to ensure their individual conservation and self-interests in any manner that their dimensions of power and abilities allow. Similarly, political actors have the same right to provide for the conservation and self-interest of their respective state or political apparatus. Because there is no definitive international political authority, no political actor acting out in the global arena “submits to . . . [any] higher law than the safety of [its] . . . realm.”¹⁹

Because there is no definitive international political sovereign,²⁰ or objective morality, political leaders must behave as if they were in a state of nature,²¹ taking actions to ensure the interests of their respective political institutions. The following statements illustrate this point:

For Hobbes . . . [political institutions] were, with respect to each other, in a condition analogous to what prevails among individuals in a state of nature The laws that dictate to men what they ought to do and avoid with regard to one another are addressed to sovereign princes in

¹⁸ Dennis Pirages, “The Origins of Ecopolitics: The Impending Revolution,” in *Toward a Just World Order*, ed. Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 474.

¹⁹ Murphy, 485.

²⁰ Jahn Beate, *The Cultural Construction of International Relations: The Invention of the State of Nature* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 150.

²¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 85.

their mutual relations. Above all, each . . . [political actor] has the same right, in protecting the safety of his people, that a particular man has in protecting the safety of his own body.²²

In a state of nature, according to Hobbes, the ability to take desirable things from others and maintain control of these things is a “right,” which is only dictated by abilities and power.²³ Hobbes posits that it is a “right of nature” to exercise power without external interference.²⁴ By definition, if state actors have the “right” (defined by Hobbes as the pursuit of self-interest) to behave as if they are in a state of nature in international affairs, then non-state terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, cannot realistically be expected to act any differently. No global actor will behave in a way that is antithetical to the state of war conditions that exist in the global political arena if other actors are not willing to do the same.²⁵ Moreover, based on the fact that each political actor expects other actors to be diffident and willing to carry out violence for the purpose of interests and conservation, then why should any actor (state or non-state) forfeit its right to do the same?²⁶ Based on this rationale, it is conceivable that forfeiting the right to carry out

²² Murphy, 484-485.

²³ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 85.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 86.

²⁵ Norman E. Bowie and Robert L. Simon, *The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 233-234.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

violence for self-interested reasons could make a global actor “vulnerable to more predatory actors.”²⁷

If this view is accurate, then the following question arises: Why should state actors, such as the United States, reasonably expect a terrorist actor, such as al Qaeda, to cease political violence when state actors facilitate acts of violence on a continual basis? For example, the levels of political violence the G. W. Bush Administration facilitates in Afghanistan and Iraq conceivably gives al Qaeda (as well as other anti-American, non-state political actors) a basis for intensifying the levels of their own political violence perpetuated as terrorist attacks. Consequently, non-state political actors such as al Qaeda may see their acts of political violence as legitimate in the same manner that the Bush Administration views its actions in Afghanistan and Iraq as legitimate. If this is the case, then these realities simply reflect the relativity of perception and morality as identified by Hobbes and delineated in this study. Applying Hobbes’s conception of moral relativity to the state-of-war conditions present in the international state of nature lends itself to the idea that conceptions of right or wrong, good or bad, justified or not justified, legitimate or non-legitimate, simply respond to the perceptive inclinations of the respective actors and have no objective basis for defining the morality of a political act. As noted, in Hobbesian theory, morality only evolves under the veil of a sovereign political authority. Political actions taken by actors in the state-of-nature conditions prevalent in the global political arena are characterized as rights and reflect the concept of *razón de estado*,

²⁷ Ibid.

raison d'état or the "necessity of state".²⁸ These concepts have traditionally been applied to the rights of states to act in the international state of nature, and powers and abilities are the only limit to these rights. However, these concepts are extended within this study to include transnational groups such as al Qaeda. The reasoning for this is as follows:

1. While it is true that political transnational groups like al Qaeda are not sovereign entities, it is also true that sovereignty, in an of itself, is not necessary nor alone sufficient for a political actor to significantly influence international relations;

2. While it is true that sovereignty can expand the dimensions of power and increase the level of capabilities that are available to actors, sovereignty alone is not a guarantee of becoming a relevant player in the global political arena;

3. In terms of al Qaeda, its lack of sovereignty and its ability to operate across national borders to build a "multinationals alliance of terrorist groups" provide an operational advantage for both recruiting and the facilitation of terrorist acts;²⁹

4. Within the state-of-war circumstances prevalent in international relations, self-interest and conservation conceptualized as reason or necessity of state is extended to transnational groups, such as al Qaeda, who view their "right" to carryout political violence as being the same as sovereign nation-states who view their "right" to do the same;

²⁸Stephen James Rupp, *Allegories of Kingship: Calderon and the Anti-Machiavellian Tradition* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 24; and Friedrich Meinecke and Douglas Scott, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D'état and Its Place in Modern History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957), 5.

²⁹ Rohan Gunaranta, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley publishing group, a division of Penguin Group - USA, 2002), 297.

5. Transnational groups such as al Qaeda have made themselves significant political actors within the international arena through the use of destructive and theatrical political terrorism such as the September 11 attacks;³⁰

6. The fact that al Qaeda is characterized as a major threat to the most powerful country in the world has solidified, at least for the time being, its role as a major global political actor that has to be acknowledged; and

7. Political transnational groups, such as al Qaeda, are viewed in this study as being conceptually similar to sovereign nation-states in the sense that they interact and affect the dissemination of power in the international political arena.

The above-stated views outline the applicability of the concept of reason of state to transnational actors like al Qaeda. The concept of reason or necessity of state is, in part, attributed to Machiavelli who was influenced in this area by Livy, Aristotle, and Xenophon.³¹ Reason or necessity of state is characterized by the realization that all political leaders have the right to act and are “justified in acting solely on the principle of . . . interest.”³² More specifically, self-interest, characterized as reason or necessity of state, is illustrated by Meinecke where he points out that global political actors are obliged to embrace violence due to “a high degree of causal necessity, which the agent

³⁰ Jane Corbin, *Al-Qaeda: The Terror Network that Threatens the World* (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002), xvi-xviii.

³¹ Meinecke, 26.

³² Ralph Barton Perry, *The Present Conflict of Ideals: A Study of the Philosophical Background of the World War* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1922), 276.

himself [i.e., the political actor] is accustomed to [and] . . . is . . . part of the very essence of all action prompted by *raison d'état*.”³³

Al Qaeda, as a less powerful, non-state actor acting out in the international state of nature, seeks to compete politically with more powerful state actors such as the United States. This represents the attempt by a weaker political actor to adopt offensive means, based on that actor's perception of causal necessity, for the purposes of competing with a more powerful actor.³⁴ Meinecke's model yields some interesting conclusions once al Qaeda is weighted in as an international political actor. Firstly, al Qaeda's inability to carryout conventional warfare against American interests limits its offensive military options. Secondly, based on this reality, it is possible to rationally view terrorist attacks, such as September 11, as representing causal necessity for al Qaeda in its attempt to use offensive means to compete with the hegemonic power of the United States, its allies, and client states.³⁵

The Hypothetical and Historical Conceptualizations of the International State of Nature as a Cause of Violent Conflict in Global Affairs

In Hobbes's view, state-of-nature conditions are represented by two different elements (the hypothetical state of nature and the historical state of nature). The first element, as outlined in Chapter 3, is the hypothetical state of nature, which illustrates the conditions that would exist among domestic societies in the absence of sovereign political

³³ Meinecke, 5-6.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

authority.³⁶ In essence, Hobbes's argument for the state of nature is "hypothetical . . . [, and] the actual existence of the state of nature is not required for the success of his argument."³⁷ The second element is historical, i.e., the "historical" state of nature is represented in the conflict of "warring groups" and has evolved into the state- of-war conditions prevalent in the international state of nature.³⁸ It is these latter conditions that lead to global political violence such as the September 11 attacks. Boucher notes that in terms of the former, "there never was a time, Hobbes admits, when . . . [the hypothetical or individual state of nature] was sufficiently prevalent to constitute a condition in which every individual was at war with every other."³⁹ Consequently, the Hobbesian state of nature is simply a hypothetical exercise used by Hobbes to illustrate the necessity of political authority.⁴⁰

However, according to Beate, the historical state of nature did exist and it consisted of group conflict that provided the basis for international hostilities and ultimately the violent conditions prevalent in contemporary international affairs.⁴¹ Toward that end, the importance of the state of nature "still lies at the heart of

³⁶ Boucher, 149.

³⁷ Bowie, 13.

³⁸ Boucher, 149.

³⁹ Ibid., 145.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 145-149.

⁴¹ Beate, 150.

mainstream contemporary international relations theory [and] . . . carries with it the same normative assumptions and political implications it had for classical thinkers.”⁴² A comparative analysis regarding the hypothetical state of nature and the state-of-nature conditions prevalent in group conflict provides an understanding of the relationship between Hobbes’s concept of the state of nature and conditions prevalent in international affairs. For example, Boucher states:

The . . . [hypothetical state of nature] is constructed by Hobbes through scientific, or philosophical, demonstration, that is, the achievement of conditional knowledge. . . . In comparing the . . . [hypothetical] state of nature with the historical . . . condition we will see that Hobbes did actually believe that the modified [historical], as opposed to the mere [hypothetical], state of nature did exist In both accounts he believed that relations between warring groups, rather than warring individuals, constituted the norm, . . .⁴³

This quote highlights the point that Hobbes did, in fact, view the state of nature as being reflected in realistic, historical conditions existing not between each individual, but between warring groups. It is these warring groups that evolved into tribes, villages, cities, city-states, and ultimately nation-states that represent the roots of international conflict. These stages are briefly discussed later in this chapter.

This study conceptualizes al Qaeda as representing a warring group carrying out violence for the purpose of facilitating group conflict. It is the facilitation of this group conflict that leads to violent political acts such as the September 11 attacks. Therefore, the terrorism of September 11 reflects the Hobbesian conception of the existence of the

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Boucher, 149.

historical state of nature and ultimately the international state of nature as a realistic illustration of conflict among warring groups.

The existence of the historical or international state of nature can be illustrated further through T. M. Franck's analysis of John Rawls' 'original position.'⁴⁴ If, according to Franck, Rawls' subsequent conclusions regarding the choices that an individual in the original position would make were extended to actors in international relations, then conditions similar to the Hobbesian state of nature would result.⁴⁵ Franck explains this delineation in the following way:

Is it possible for states' representatives, in the original position, negotiating behind the veil of ignorance, to arrive at an applicable principle of justice to guide their actions? What might such a principle look like . . . ?

While the state of nature may, indeed, describe one tendency in contemporary Realpolitik, it would be exceedingly odd if that were to coincide with an ideal of justice. Such coincidence between what the negotiators in the original position agree upon, and Hobbes's state of nature, should warn us that something must be wrong with the model producing that result.⁴⁶

Franck's position is that political actors representing political institutions and organizations in the global arena, put in Rawls' original position, would choose alternatives that would lead to an international state of nature. Implicitly, the first reason for this is that anarchy (as it exists in global relations) is not based on a fair system of justice, but rather on the unabridged right of actors to pursue their security and interests in any way they see fit. Therefore, in the absence of a sovereign political authority, (such as that which would exist in a domestic setting capable of enforcing any rational agreement between the individuals negotiating behind the "veil of ignorance") no rational

⁴⁴ Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 220-221.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

global political actor would willingly give up its right to ensure its own security and pursuit of interests. Furthermore, the veil of ignorance, where no actor knows their specific power capabilities, would potentially encourage most to choose an anarchical state of nature where weaker actors have the right to make themselves stronger and stronger actors have the right to increase their power. The implications of Rawls's theory for international relations, put within a framework that takes into consideration the absence of an international sovereign, would be completely different from the implications of his theory for a domestic society, consisting of a sovereign political authority.

The Role of Equality and Diffidence in the International State of Nature as a Cause of Violent Conflict such as the September 11 Attacks

It is the Hobbesian concept of equality that represents a relevant link between Hobbes's hypothetical state of nature and the international state of nature in terms of the causes of violent conflict. If no civil sovereign authority exist, then the egoistic tendencies of self-interested behavior and the pursuit of conservation and glorification leads to diffidence in individuals and ultimately to the state of nature. By applying this concept to political actors in international relations, it is possible to show that equality leads to diffidence and ultimately violent conflict among political actors in the global political arena. The equality that Hobbes conceptualizes is not necessarily an equality of equals, but rather an equality of desire to express and fulfill the stated egoistic tendencies facilitated as goals and objectives.⁴⁷ This is reflected in some of the goals of al Qaeda. For example, the equality of the desire to express and fulfill the stated egoistic tendencies

⁴⁷ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 82.

illustrates the previously stated point that al Qaeda realizes that it cannot compete with the overwhelming force of the United States in a conventional military conflict. However, the organization is determined to challenge the United States' power and dominance in some competitive form.⁴⁸ This competition takes on the character of political violence facilitated as terrorist acts such as the September 11 attacks. The desire to compete with the United States represents the equality of will to achieve political goals through political violence, just as America, its allies, and client states use political violence to achieve some of their political goals. The level of the political violence or the capability to facilitate this violence may not be equal, but the desire to achieve interest-based goals through violence is relatively equal. In addition to this application of the Hobbesian concept of equality, the most extreme example of state-of-war conditions in international relations—nuclear weapons—is worth noting in regards to the role of equality in causing violent global conflict. For example, Gauthier posits that:

The advent of nuclear weapons . . . has introduced a new element into the equation. If nuclear proliferation advances at its present rate, . . . then an ever increasing number of nations will come to share this dreadful equality. And so we may look to Hobbes's account of the natural condition of mankind, with a view to understanding better our own international situation.⁴⁹

This statement by Gauthier, written in 1969, has proven to be predictive. For example, since the "Axis of Evil" statement by G. W. Bush regarding Iran, Iraq, and

⁴⁸ Paul Williams, *Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror* (USA: Alpha-A Pearson Education Company, 2002), 3-7.

⁴⁹ Boucher, 207-208.

North Korea, we have seen the reinstatement of the North Korean nuclear program.⁵⁰ Additionally, Iran is putting serious resources into the development of its own nuclear program.⁵¹ Correspondingly, al Qaeda is attempting to acquire nuclear capability and know-how of its own due to the fact that this technology is potentially attainable via the international black market and the ex-Soviet military apparatus.⁵² Besides the threat of a nuclear attack, the organization could seek to set off a “dirty bomb,” which:

[Potentially,] . . . could be paired with conventional explosives and turned into a crude, non-fissionable atomic bomb For example, a combination fertilizer truck bomb with radioactive agents could have not only destroyed one of the World Trade Center's towers, but also rendered a considerable chunk of prime real estate in one of the world's financial nerve centers indefinitely unusable because of radioactive contamination. The prospect not only of the resulting disruption to commerce, but of the attendant publicity and enhanced coercive power of terrorists armed with such ‘dirty’ bombs (arguably a more credible risk than terrorist acquisition of fissile nuclear weapons), is deeply disturbing.⁵³

The equality equation within international relations would most likely change if al Qaeda acquires even a limited nuclear/radioactive threat trajectory. Furthermore, if the organization does initiate a nuclear or dirty bomb attack on an American target, the U.S.

⁵⁰ “Seymour Hersh’s Timeline of North Korean Nuclear Program: Who is to Blame? [*sic*],” [resource online] (Earthlink.net, accessed 12 March 2003); available from <http://home.earthlink.net/~platter/misc/nk-nuke-timeline.html>; Internet; quoted in “The

⁵¹ Peter Rudolf, “Critical Engagement: The European Union and Iran,” in *Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe, and Problem Countries*, ed. Richard N. Haass (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999), 88.

⁵² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 204.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

Government does not have a specific al Qaeda target to retaliate against. Because al Qaeda is a non-sovereign actor, there is no specific territorial or geographic area of land to attack. Consequently, with a transnational actor such as al Qaeda, the concept of deterrence is useless. From a strategic standpoint, the following question evolves: How can nuclear deterrence be effective since the al Qaeda leadership realizes that the United States has no specific target to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike against? This example illustrates the desire of subordinate political actors to equalize their destructive willingness with a dominant political actor. As noted, this equalization of want is not an equality of the potential for destruction, but rather an equality of the desire to facilitate political violence as a competitive mechanism against a more dominant political actor.

Even a small-scale attack with a battlefield nuclear weapon or dirty bomb would cause havoc and chaos in the United States. The threat of a minimum nuclear or dirty bomb attack by Iran, North Korea, or al Qaeda on American soil or against American interests is equal to the threat of a massive nuclear attack by the United States against one of these actors. The fear factor of even a minimum nuclear/dirty bomb attack against American interests or on American soil is, in and of itself, an equalizing mechanism in terms of the thought processes of subordinate global political actors (like al Qaeda) or nation-states that feel threatened by or that are competing with the U.S.

Another sense of equality implicit in the Hobbesian international state of nature framework is described by George Soros as being synonymous to George Orwell's

Animal Farm where “all animals are equal but some are more equal than others.”⁵⁴ This view represents the dominant-subordinate conditions in the international state of nature and reflects a “horizontal authority” and a hierarchical order developed and maintained through the exercise of power and force.⁵⁵ This international power hierarchy is analogous to the nature of groups in primitive societies that are absent of sovereign political authority: The law of ‘primitive societies,’ [is] absent of centralized government enforcing it and, thus, has to be enforced by certain groups within society itself. It consists only of primary rules and lacks the secondary ones, the rules about rules. Hence, international law differs from civil law and is more like the law that existed among “primitive cultures”.⁵⁶ This position illustrates the following conceptions:

1. There is a discernable difference between the conditions of equality that exist within domestic societies consisting of civil authority and primitive societies with no established civil authority;

2. There is a discernable difference between the conditions of equality that exist within domestic societies, with civil authority, and the international political arena, absent of an international political sovereign;

⁵⁴ George Soros, “America’s Global Role: Why the Fight for a Worldwide Open Society Begins at Home,” *The American Prospect*, [magazine on-line] (Boston: The American Prospect On-line, June 2003, accessed 5 July 2003); available from http://www.soros.org/gsbio/american_prospect_052703.htm; Internet.

⁵⁵ Mark A. Boyer and John T. Rourke, *World Politics: International Politics on the World Stage*, brief 2d ed. (USA: Duskin/McGraw Hill, 1998), 49.

⁵⁶ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press), 1977, 164.

3. The international state of nature most “resembles” the conditions of equality prevalent in primitive societies with little or no sovereign authority;

4. In societies with a political/civil authority the sovereign power establishes and enforces the “secondary rules” of society;

5. However, in the absence of a sovereign authority, groups within primitive societies enforce “primary rules” and this is congruent with the international state of nature, wherein (in the absence of an international sovereign authority) more powerful political actors (like the United States) enforce “primary rules” that are often in their own perceived self-interests; and

6. Ultimately, even though a state of nature exists in international relations, there are “rules” that are established and enforced by the more powerful actors that are designed to serve their perceived self-interests.⁵⁷

While the international state of nature is a state of war, it is not a constant state of war because, as Hoffman contends, “there are forces capable of ensuring a minimum of order.”⁵⁸ However, these forces tend to be more powerful political actors (hegemonic actors) that constrict or expand the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international political arena in their own interests. For example, the United States, as the world’s only remaining superpower, facilitates and initiates certain primary rules on the world order. Specifically, since the September 11 incident, the G. W. Bush Administration has facilitated these primary rules through policies based upon American military dominance.

⁵⁷ Franck, 184.

⁵⁸ Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy Or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 108.

This proliferation of American military might has been facilitated through increases in military expenditures. For example, in 2003 the U.S. Government spent \$396.1 billion, or 17.8 percent of the entire federal budget on military expenditures and another \$187 billion for the occupation in Iraq.⁵⁹ This amount of military spending surpasses the military spending of 25 nation-states.⁶⁰ Despite these realities, the G. W. Bush Administration has continuously carried out political violence and threatened other political actors for their possession and/or presumed attempts to procure weapons of mass destruction. The Administration has attacked and occupied Iraq under the guise of destroying weapons of mass destruction, while Iran, Syria, and North Korea have all been threatened for their possession of or perceived attempts to acquire these weapons, as well. These actions on the part of the United States represent the enforcement of primary rules by a hegemonic actor in the international state of nature in the same way that more powerful groups enforce certain primary rules on other groups in a primitive state of nature absent of sufficient sovereign authority.

The facilitation of the primary rules by a hegemonic power, in this case the U.S., in the international state of nature may conceivably be perceived by certain political

⁵⁹ Gilles D'Aymery, comp. "U.S. Military Budget for FY 2003," [on-line database] (Swans, 6 March 2002, accessed 30 April, 2002); available from <http://www.swans.com/library/dossiers/mil2003.html>; Internet.

⁶⁰ Center for Defense Information. "Pentagon Spending Package: Exceeds that of the Next 25 Nations," [on-line database] (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, accessed 11 November 2003); available from <http://www.cdi.org/document/search/displaydoc.cfm?DocumentID=216&StartRow=1&ListRows=10>; Internet.

actors, such as al Qaeda, as being in opposition to their interests. Placed within a Hobbesian perspective, this represents the possibility that al Qaeda, its operatives, and its supporters may conceivably view the hegemonic control by the U.S. as being worse than a complete state of nature, absent of even primary rules.

A hegemonic hierarchy, such as the one the G. W. Bush Administration has attempted to facilitate after the September 11 attacks, represents the attempt of a powerful actor to exert dominance of less powerful subordinate actors over other actors. This is parallel to existence of “an unequal alliance”⁶¹ of actors in international relations. This represents the prevalence of an “empirically demonstrable power hierarchy” that exists in international relations.⁶² What this power hierarchy reflects is the existence of a “community of interests” controlled by a dominant political actor who has specific goals and objectives.⁶³ This dominant political actor [the United States] controls its community of interests and dictates policy to the degree that its power capabilities allow. Current members of this United States-led community of interests that are significant to the concerns of this study are Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Israel, and Egypt. While some of these actors are ideologically or religiously opposed themselves, such as the noted Arab states and Israel, it is the United States as the dominant leader of the coalition that provides the cohesive element in the mix of competing interests.

⁶¹ Edwin Dewitt Dickinson, *The Equality of States in International Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 50.

⁶² Franck, 10.

⁶³ William Christie MacLeod, *The Origin and History of Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1931), 5.

However, when other political actors feel that their interests have been forcibly subordinated to the dominant interests of the American-led coalition, they may resort to acts of political violence such as terrorism to compete with the dominant power brought to bear by the American-led coalition.

This study posits that al Qaeda represents a political actor whose perceived interests have been left out of the community of interests propagated by the United States, its allies, and client states. The only way that al Qaeda believes that it can compete with the American-led community of interests is through acts of political violence designed to motivate the coalition to recognize and/or accommodate al Qaeda's perceived interests. Such acts of political violence are facilitated by subordinate political actors to establish a "balance of terror" that serves to compete with dominant political actors.⁶⁴

The perception of being a subordinate actor on the part of al Qaeda and its supporters is similar to the power position of less powerful actors being dominated in domestic societies by more powerful actors. In this example the dominant actor develops a network of interests and protects and facilitates its and the network's interests at the expense of the repressed, subordinate groups whose interests are left out of any relevant considerations.⁶⁵ As Hagen notes, "the political repression gradually convinces the mass of the people (subordinate actors), increasingly bitter under their frustration and

⁶⁴ Hoffmann, 108.

⁶⁵ Everett E. Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change," in *Readings in Modern Political Analysis*, ed. Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. Neubauer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 188-189.

humiliation, that they can find no relief in moderate movements for reform, and it gradually breeds in them bitterness and rage [and ultimately] . . . violence and extremism.”⁶⁶ This analytical scenario provides the basis for an understanding of the popular support for al Qaeda and its agenda on the part of some Muslims.

The United States-led hierarchical community of interests that currently exist in the international state of nature is antithetical to the traditional concepts of balance of power politics and may potentially provide the basis for increased violent hostilities in global affairs. Rourke defines balance of power as an “equilibrium of power in the world [designed] . . . to prevent any country or coalition of countries from dominating the system.”⁶⁷ Hoffman contends that balance of power politics provides the basis for some degree of order in the otherwise state-of-war conditions prevalent in the global political arena.⁶⁸ This view, suggests Hoffman, represents a trend in European political thought where “European political thinkers have had a way of presenting the balance of power as about as moderate and reasonable an arrangement as one has the right to expect in the international state of nature and as the crowning achievement of a golden age in diplomacy and international law.”⁶⁹ The European concept of the balance of power eventually evolved into Cold War bipolarity and effectively served to limit conflict

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Rourke, 17.

⁶⁸ Hoffmann, 99.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

between the U.S.-led community of interests and the Soviet Bloc.⁷⁰ However, both sides initiated hostilities carried out in the form of surrogate wars in subordinate societies as well as their respective client states.⁷¹ The view that an equalizing balance of power in the global political arena provides a rationale for the best means of restraint in the international state of nature war is congruent with Hobbes's conceptions regarding limiting hostilities among actors in international relations.⁷² Implicit in this fact, suggest Fidler and Hoffman, is that:

Hobbes is, . . . the father of utilitarian theories of international law and relations; and we can extrapolate from his theories, for policy guidance, the notion of the balance of power: although fragile, it is a relatively efficient technique for enforcing the 'laws of nature', since it corresponds to the interests all participants have in keeping the competition moderate.⁷³

However, with the end of the Cold War, the emergence of non-state transnational groups such as al Qaeda, and the hegemonic foreign policy initiatives taken by the G. W. Bush Administration after the September 11 attacks, balance of power politics have been subordinated to an increase in the intensification of transnational terrorism and American hegemonic dominance. These two political phenomena have led to an exacerbation of hostilities in the international state of nature.

⁷⁰ Alfonso Gonzalez, ed., introduction to *The New Third World*, ed. Jim Norwine (Boulder: Perseus, 1998), 3.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Fidler and Hoffman, xlv.

⁷³ Ibid.

A further exploration into this issue brings the inquiry into a discussion of the designation of global poles. As noted above, the conditions of a bipolar world decreased armed conflict among the major global political actors during the Cold War. However, in the conditions of the post Cold War and post September 11 world, different applications must be considered. In the post Cold War and post September 11 global arena, a unipolar global system has evolved.⁷⁴ This unipolar system consists of the U.S. as the hegemonic, or dominant power. Resultantly, the hegemon “resists attempts by subordinate units to achieve independence or greater autonomy.”⁷⁵ However, for actors who challenge the U.S.-led hierarchy, or are not within the perceived spectrum of American interests, this structure could be perceived as repressive. The perception of being victims of repression may lead actors such as Iran, Syria, and some African and Indonesian states with large Muslim populations, to conceivably form coalitions with transnational groups such as al Qaeda. The foundation for such coalition building may not have existed prior to the unipolar hegemonic policy initiatives of the G. W. Bush Administration after the September 11 attacks. As such, it is potentially possible that the Bush Administration’s unipolar policy initiatives have actually laid the groundwork for such cooperation among these actors. The basis of this coalition building is conceivably founded on such factors as fear, diffidence, the equality of desire to accomplish self-interested goals, and a desire to limit and challenge the power of the U.S.-led community of interests. Both the attempts of the G. W. Bush Administration to promote a U.S.-led

⁷⁴ Boyer and Rourke, 55.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

unipolar hegemony and the attempts of subordinate actors such as the above-stated nation-states and al Qaeda fit perfectly into the Hobbesian conception that political actors will and should seek to dominate competitors and that actors are naturally empowered to attack competitors in the pursuit of interests.⁷⁶

It is the attempt to dominate competitors, combined with the elements of equality outlined earlier, that leads to diffidence. Chapter 3 illustrated that Hobbes's concept of equality leads to diffidence in the state of nature. According to Hobbes, diffidence or mistrust of others is a major cause of conflict in the individual state of nature. Extending this Hobbesian conceptualization to the conditions that exist in the global state of nature, Howard Warrender posits that:

The chief source of instability and distrust in international relations, as in Hobbes's State of Nature, is not that men will act to meet patent danger, but that they will also act to meet hypothetical danger. States do not merely fight when they are actually attacked, but follow what are sometimes called in diplomatic language, abstract principles of precaution. It is with such actions, designed to meet potential danger, that Hobbes's theory is centrally concerned, and it is these actions which are only conditionally excused in his ethical theory.⁷⁷

It is diffidence or distrust, therefore, which leads actors to be motivated by fear. This fear may not reflect a real threat to survival or interests, but rather may simply be based on a perceived hypothetical danger. This perception of danger based on diffidence may lead to the use of preemption in the international state of nature where no actor can consistently settle paranoid feelings of mistrust and actors are in a continual state of fear of attack from others. The fear of another terrorist attack and the mistrust of Muslims or

⁷⁶ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 151.

⁷⁷ Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 119.

people of Arab dissent rose tremendously in the United States after the September 11 attacks. This diffidence or fear has led to the ability of the G. W. Bush Administration to initiate policies that never would have been possible before the attacks. Drawing inferences from this line of reasoning, Jim Lobe writes:

Since Sept. 11, the Bush Administration has aggressively deployed U.S. troops around the globe, promised military aid to dozens of countries, and has unilaterally undermined the global arms-control regime -- all in the name of a 'war on terrorism.'

In just a few months, Washington has pledged or provided new military aid -- from training, equipment or, most significantly, advisers -- to some two dozen countries, among them Armenia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen, not to mention Afghanistan, where the United States intends to build a national army

Over the same period, Bush walked away from global negotiations on biological weapons control, withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, widely considered a cornerstone of international arms-control, and proposed increasing the defense budget in 2003 by \$48 billion. The increase alone is greater than the amount any of Washington's NATO allies devotes to its military in an entire year

More recently, a leaked government document revealed the administration intends to lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons. The Defense Department is planning to develop smaller, more "precise" nuclear bombs, and may consider using them preemptively against countries suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction.⁷⁸

The American public and significant elements of the American media reacted with diffidence to the September 11 attacks. The G. W. Bush Administration intensified these feelings of diffidence through the use of language designed to increase the fear factor in the American public. However, many of the policy initiatives taken by the Bush Administration after the September 11 attacks appear to have nothing to do with the acts

⁷⁸ Jim Lobe, "Bush's Foreign Policy Blueprint: A Grand Global Plan," [journal on-line] (*TomPaine.CommonSense: A Public Interest Journal*, 26 March 2002, accessed 7 July 2003); available from <http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/5345>; Internet;.

of violence perpetrated on the American homeland. Jim Lobe contends that high-ranking members of the G. W. Bush Administration developed many of these policies as far back as 1991 when they were part of the elder President Bush's Administration:

The Bush administration's actions fit neatly into a plan for United States hegemony first mapped out in a draft Pentagon paper 10 years ago. The secret document, known as the 'Defense Policy Guidance,' was written by two relatively obscure civilian Pentagon officials in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

The main authors were Paul Wolfowitz, now the deputy secretary of defense and widely considered among the most hawkish of administration officials, and I. Lewis 'Scooter' Libby, a lawyer who now serves as Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff and national security adviser. During the first Bush administration, both men were working for Cheney, who was defense secretary. . .

Democratic Sen. Joseph Biden, now chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called it a prescription for 'a Pax Americana,' or a world order enforced by U.S. power.

The uproar subsided only after National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and then-Secretary of State James Baker prevailed on Cheney to tone down the final draft, which he did. Though the document may have been revised, administration initiatives today seem strikingly similar to the original.

According to the original draft, preventing the emergence of a rival superpower 'is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.'

In addition to Western Europe, these regions include '. . . East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union and Southwest Asia,' the same three regions where the new Bush administration has been most promiscuous in deploying military forces since 9/11.

Indeed, under the new world order envisaged by Wolfowitz and Libby a decade ago, American military intervention around the world would come to be seen "as a constant feature, 'according to the draft . . .'

Though the strategies in the document outraged many in 1992, the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon seem to have provided the pretext for Wolfowitz, Libby, and like-minded officials to use a war against terror to reintroduce their 10-year-old ambitions.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Ibid.

Additionally, three years before the September 11 attacks, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a neo-conservative strategic think tank, began crafting what would become current American foreign policy.⁸⁰ Members of this group, many of whom are now high-ranking members of the G. W. Bush Administration, called for war in Iraq as early as January 1998 where in a letter addressed to then President Clinton they write:

We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War . . . That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power.⁸¹

This letter called for the removal of the Hussein regime and the deployment of American troops to Iraq as far back as 1998. Moreover, just nine days after the September 11 attacks, the group again called for an attack of Iraq attempting to link the attacks with Hussein:

It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to the recent attack on the United States . . . Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism . . . American military force should be used to provide a 'safe zone' in Iraq from which the opposition can operate. And American forces must be prepared to back up our commitment to the Iraqi [resistance] . . . by all necessary means.⁸²

⁸⁰ PNAC, "Letter to Bill Clinton," [on-line resource] (Washington, D.C.: Project for a New American Century, accessed 6 January 1998); available from <http://newamericancentury.org/Clintonletter.htm>; Internet.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² PNAC, "Letter to George W. Bush," [on-line resource] (Washington, D.C.: Project for a New American Century, accessed 3 October 2003); available from <http://newamericancentury.org/Clintonletter.htm>; Internet.

No evidence has emerged that Saddam Hussein helped plan, finance, or facilitate the September 11 attacks. However, over 70 percent of Americans believed that he helped plan and facilitate the attacks.⁸³ These statistics uphold the view that the American public was reacting out of diffidence and fear after September 11 and that the G. W. Bush Administration used these passions to initiate certain policy changes. Furthermore, these facts indicate that without the September 11 attacks and the subsequent diffidence that evolved in the American public and media, such aggressive foreign policy initiatives could not have been carried out by the Administration. By characterizing these policies as the “War Against Terror,” the Bush Administration framed his policies as essential steps to counter a state of war. Writing about the necessities of war, John Locke argues that it is impossible for political authority to “regulate (the) demands of war.”⁸⁴ Locke further states:

[It is true] . . . that a powerful people, made powerful by the material increase resulting from the encouragement of the desire for comfortable preservation under the protection of established laws of liberty, must face always the possibility of battle, a situation in which citizens must be dutiful, public-spirited, and ready to sacrifice treasure and perhaps even their lives, under the discretionary command of the executive federative [*sic*] power, for the defense of the society as a whole.⁸⁵

⁸³ Associated Press, “70% In U.S. Believe Saddam Linked To 911 – Poll” *The Globe and Mail* [resource on-line] (Bell Globemedia Interactive, 6 September 2003, accessed 16 September 2003); available from [http:// www.globeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20030906.wpoll0906/BNStory/International/](http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20030906.wpoll0906/BNStory/International/); Internet.

⁸⁴ Robert A. Goldwin, “John Locke,” in *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Joseph Cropsey and Leo Strauss (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), 464-465.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Certainly Locke's assessment of the commonwealth's response to war fits very well with the Bush Administration's policies after the September 11 attacks. Of particular relevance is the statement that the citizenry should defer to the "discretionary command of the executive federative [*sic*] power." This view is parallel with the G. W. Bush Administration's post September 11 policies and are best reflected in the adoption of HR 3162 RDS, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, better known as the USA PATRIOT ACT.⁸⁶ The degree to which this act and other measures taken after the September 11 attacks have infringed on the rights of American citizens in the name of security could prove to provide the impetus for a constitutional crisis.⁸⁷

The nature of Locke's statements is further reflected in the general attitude pervasive in the United States immediately after the September 11 attacks. This general attitude reflects the belief that the powers of the chief executive political authority should be extended for reasons of national security. This is congruent with the previously noted Hobbesian concept that the actions of the sovereign should not be questioned. This also reflects the important role of diffidence and fear and how they have gripped the country after the September 11 attacks. It should also be noted, however, that the creation of an environment of diffidence and fear is also one of the goals of al Qaeda in carrying out

⁸⁶ U.S. Senate, USA PATRIOT Act, HR 3162 RDS, 107th Congress 1st Session, in the Senate of the United States, [database on-line] (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 24 October 2001, accessed 12 December 2002); available from <http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html>; Internet.

⁸⁷ Nancy Chang, "The War on Dissent," [on-line magazine] (*The Nation*, 26 August 2004, accessed 3 September 2004); 2002. available from <http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040913&s=chang>; Internet.

terrorist attacks. When a national crisis, such as the September 11 attacks occurs, it bonds a national community at the expense of exacerbating the hostilities prevalent in the international state of nature. After the attacks, the U.S. experienced a surge in nationalism initiated in congressional, U.S. media, and public support for the resulting policies of the G. W. Bush Administration. With the support of the media and the American public, the Bush Administration has expanded the hostilities in the international political arena to new post Cold War heights, exacerbating the state-of-war conditions in the global state of nature.⁸⁸ The Bush Administration has done this by deploying military troops to many strategic areas of the world and potentially making certain state and non-state political actors like Iran, Syria, North Korea, and a significant percentage of the global Muslim community diffident regarding American foreign policy agendas. Additionally, there is a chance that al Qaeda will view the militarily based actions of the United States as a clear sign of an amplification of state of nature hostilities, and, subsequently, this may increase the level of its desire to sponsor other terrorist attacks.

**The Evolution of the International State of Nature from
Violence Among Warring Groups to Political Violence such as the September 11
Terrorist Attacks**

As noted, Hobbes's implies that the real historical circumstance of the state of nature exists between warring groups, as opposed to individuals. These warring groups evolved into tribes, villages, cities, city-states and eventually nation-states, with each respective stage being based on a simultaneous change in the respective mode of production, the nature of political authority, and the intensification of the level of

⁸⁸ Lobe, <http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/5345>; Internet.

hostilities between political actors.⁸⁹ The four-stage approach as outlined by Adam Smith reflects this evolution.⁹⁰ The first stage consists of hunting and fishing groups; the second stage, agrarian societies; the third, the domesticators of live stock; and the fourth, the “age of commerce.”⁹¹ Each evolutionary stage of societal development corresponds to an increase in private property, and thus, to an increase in the responsibilities and obligations of political authorities to limit domestic hostilities, protect private property⁹² and provide the mechanisms for an expansion in the acquisition of the property of others, inclusive of the invasion of other societies for the enrichment of individuals in the homeland. For example, Beate points out that the political authority in Spain struggled to come up with new political mechanisms to accomplishment its desire to exploit the lands and peoples of the Americas, so that the accumulation of wealth could be filtered back to Spain.⁹³

Smith’s four-stage theory is congruent with Hobbes’s conceptions of natural law, competition, the role of power acquisition, and the development, necessity, and role of political authority. Through the use of these concepts, both Hobbes and Smith suggest

⁸⁹ John W. Cairns, “The influence of Smith's Jurisprudence on Legal Education in Scotland: Legal Education and Natural Law,” in *Adam Smith Reviewed*, ed. Peter Jones and Andrew S. Skinner (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 174-188 passim.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Beate, 51-52.

that the competitive pursuit of self-interest, power acquisition, and the desire to be master of other's property is natural. Implicit in this reasoning (at least from a Hobbesian perspective) is the point that these natural conditions led to conflict and ultimately to violence as international relations became a violent struggle for the dominance of material wealth and resources. It is this motivation for dominance by the United States, its allies, and client states to which groups such as al Qaeda are violently opposed. Another historical basis for conflict among groups is the concept of territoriality. For example, Duchacek writes:

The human race has lived for millennia in separate territorial compartments - local, tribal, or national-and organized its work, set common goals, and progressed toward them within geographically delineated areas, large or small. The political organization of the world is still primarily based on territorial divisions and subdivisions of the land surface and its imaginary extensions into the seas and air space. The territorial segments both reflect and shape geographically delineated territorial interests.⁹⁴

This territorial view of group conflict reflects Hobbes's conceptions of the pursuit of interests, or what Duchacek designates as "territorial interests," carried on in state of nature conditions. Territories containing resources such as oil, water, or minerals are strategically important and provide the basis for the growth and ultimately the survival of a society. In terms of al Qaeda, territoriality is also important, but not in the sense of sovereign territory. For example, the Islamic Holy places are sacred in Islamic religious traditions. As fundamentalists, al Qaeda views the presence of non-Islamic military personnel on holy ground as sacrilege.⁹⁵ One example is the presence of American

⁹⁴ Duchacek, 3.

⁹⁵ Gunaranta, 117-118.

troops in Saudi Arabia, near the most sacred territory in Islamic tradition.⁹⁶ This fact is continuously used by bin Laden as a rationale for attacking American interests.⁹⁷ Consequently, territory is essential to the goals of the al Qaeda leadership. Additionally, al Qaeda seeks to overthrow what it deems as corrupt, American-influenced Islamic regimes, and replace them with Islamic fundamentalist political authority. This is similar to the scenario that took place with the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁹⁸ If successful, such a change in political authority would represent the acquisition of sovereign territory by al Qaeda.

However, in its current capacity as a transnational actor, al Qaeda represents an increase in the relevance of political transnational groups in the global political arena. Oots contends that this reality reflects a regression or reversal of the teleological evolution of the nation-state from the group, where groups such as al Qaeda represent non-state transnational political entities.⁹⁹ This multi-national ethnic and religious-based group association, in the form of transnational organizations, represents a challenge to the international authority of nation-states.¹⁰⁰ As Oots suggests, “transnational religious

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Kamal Azfar, “Bin Laden Warns of Full Fledged Action Against U.S.,” *Ausaf*, 1 January 1999, 4.

⁹⁹ Kent Layne Oots, *A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 4.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

regimes (such as al Qaeda) offer alternative access to the international community, as well as alternative standards and symbols of legitimacy” Transnational actors may provide an enclave for Muslims who may feel that their interests are ignored by their respective nation-state.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, it is conceivable that the propagandized rhetoric and political terrorist attacks facilitated by Qa’ida may provide a sense of Pan Islamic legitimacy and power for a significant percentage of Muslims within the international community. Because of these realities, the authority and the legitimacy of the nation-state is being challenged by political transnational actors such as al Qaeda. Hoffman notes that, “the legitimacy of the nation-state does not by itself guarantee the nation-state's . . . [authority] in the international state of nature, and the appeal of nationalism as an emancipating passion does not assure that the nation-state must everywhere remain the basic form of social organization in a world”.¹⁰² In like manner, al Qaeda does not base its structure on national identity but rather uses its particular vein of Pan Islamic religious fundamentalism as a unifying mechanism that allows the organization to recruit and garner support from the global Muslim community, regardless of national or even regional identity. Within the state-of- nature conditions prevalent in the global political arena, these geopolitical realities allow for a transnational actor such as al Qaeda to flourish in garnering popular support.

¹⁰¹ James P. Piscatori and Susann Hoeber Rudolph, *Transnational Religion and Fading States* (Westview Press, 1997), 167.

¹⁰² Stanley Hoffmann, *The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-1994* (Westview Press, 1995), 73.

If al Qaeda continues to garner support from some of the international Muslim communities, then one can conceivably expect a continuance of terrorism, played out in the international state of nature and directed against the United States-led community of interests. Similarly, if the United States continues its attempts at unipolar, hegemonic dominance through state-facilitated political violence and the facilitation of financial incentives to encourage compliance with American foreign policy, then al Qaeda may garner even more support for and recruitment of Muslims who are fearful, diffident, and resentful of American global dominance.

Summarizing Thoughts

This chapter has sought to clarify the contention that it is the Hobbesian natural egoistic tendencies (pursuit of self-interests, pursuit of glory, and pursuit of self-preservation) of human political actors, expressed through the political apparatuses of their respective states, institutions, organizations, or groups acting out in the international state of nature that leads to political violence (inclusive of the September 11 attacks) in global affairs. Secondly, this chapter has shown that these natural egoistic tendencies lead to diffidence and equality of desire among human political actors, which further exacerbate the state-of-nature conditions in global affairs. Furthermore, the historical realities of group conflict between warring, primitive groups, have evolved into the complexities of contemporary international relations, of which transnational terrorism is one phenomenon. It was these egoistic state-of-nature conditions, both historical and hypothetical, that led a subordinate transnational actor (al Qaeda) to facilitate terrorist attacks against a dominant actor (the United States.) on September 11, 2001.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The September 11 terrorist attacks are an example of acts of political violence that, unfortunately, killed thousands of American noncombatant civilians. Political violence across the globe represents phenomena that kill thousands of noncombatant civilians, annually. However, the September 11 attack brought political violence to the American homeland. These attacks occurred on American soil and not in some distant place seemingly light years from the realities of everyday American life. This was the first major foreign attack on U.S. soil since the Pearl Harbor attacks¹ and the War of 1812.² These attacks left a legacy of fear, diffidence, and vengefulness in the psyche of Americans that will be historically relevant for generations to come. Anytime a loss of life occurs in the pursuit of political goals, whether these goals are considered legitimate or not, it reflects the inability of human political actors to put into place the institutional structures and restraints necessary to limit the expression of the Hobbesian natural egoistic tendencies outlined in this study.

¹ Scribe Multipublishing Services, *Essential Pearl Harbor* [on-line resource] (Philadelphia: Scribe Multipublishing Services accessed 6 October 2002); available from <http://216.168.37.48/FMPro?-DB=osehph.FP3&-FORMAT=/scribe/osehph/osehphformat.html&ReferenceNumber=OSEHPH038&-Max=1&-Find>; Internet.

² Miriam Greenblatt, *The War of 1812* (New York: Facts on File, An Infobase Holdings Company, 1994), 11-14.

Other Perspectives of September 11

Various simplistic perspectives have emerged to explain the causes of the September 11 attacks. For example, Lee Harris points out that the roots of Arab terrorism lie in the historical realities of the economic and political subjugation of poor Muslim societies by Western societies.³ While this explanation does provide a somewhat realistic historical analysis, it fails to provide a complete conceptual model that takes into account relevant political realities. Conversely, G. W. Bush provided a similarly simplistic but different analysis, when he told American citizens, the media, and the world that the reasons for the attacks lie in the fact that the terrorists are “evil” and represent “dark forces” that hate America because it is a prosperous, democratic society.⁴ Based on this logic, President Bush has reasoned, the most rational approach to counter these “dark forces” is to engage in a type of modern-day military “crusade” against Arab Muslim society until we root out anti-American sentiment.⁵ Reasoning

³ Lee Harris, “Al Qaeda's Fantasy Ideology: War Without Clausewitz,” *Policy Review* 114 (2002): 20-21.

⁴ Tisdall, Simon. “Resist the Official Pol-Speak [sic] of Bush's 'War on Terror': From Civilization' to 'WMD' - Words are Weapons in the Global Crusade,” [newspaper on-line] (London: Guardian Newspapers Limited, 4 November 2003, accessed 13 December 2003); available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1077086,00.html>; Internet.

⁵ Ibid.

such as this reflects a Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations” that further exacerbates the state-of-war conditions in the international state of nature.⁶ However, while such narrow explanations may have served the Bush Administration's need for a straightforward rhetorical answer to this question, any truly scholarly, theoretical approach that takes into account the existence of the Hobbesian egoistic tendencies and the realities of the conditions prevalent in the international state of nature would largely reject this analysis. Amongst propagandized rhetoric, over-emotive responses, unfounded claims of weapons of mass destruction, nationalistic fervor, and narrow horticultural metaphors, there is a need for an objective analysis that attempts to rationalize the causes and manifestations of the September 11 attacks within a theoretical framework that ultimately can yield a practical and realistic explanatory model.

A Brief Review of Research Structure and Objectives

Toward that end, this study hypothesized that one such theoretical framework that can be employed to answer the perplexing questions concerning the causes of the attacks lie in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, his concept of egoist human nature, and his view of the state of nature extrapolated to the state-of-war conditions that exist in international relations. The main objective of this study has been to draw a conceptual connection between the expression of these egoistic tendencies by human political actors, certain historical realities concerning the evolution of competing/warring groups, and the dynamic occurrences prevalent in the international state of nature to the following question: What caused the September 11 terrorist attacks?

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, first trade paperback edition (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 183-185.

In further support of the hypothesis adopted in this analysis, Seumas Milne posits that America's "record of unabashed national egotism and arrogance . . . drives anti-Americanism among swaths of the world's population, for whom there is little democracy in the current distribution of global wealth and power."⁷ Individuals of Islamic faith represent a huge global demographic, one comprised largely of non-democratic nation-states. To a significant degree, they also represent one variable in the unequal balance of global wealth and power. At the top end of this unequal distribution of wealth and power is the U.S., characterized by its continued egoistic pursuit of more wealth and power.⁸ As outlined in this study, the egoistic pursuit of power and glorification also seems to underlay the objectives of al Qaeda.⁹ Consequently, the September 11 attacks tactically represent one political act in the strategic plan of the al Qaeda organization in the accomplishment of these objectives.¹⁰ One example of the connection between Islamic terrorism and glorification is the fact that, syntactically speaking, the notion of "jihad

⁷ Seumas Milne, *They Can't See Why They Are Hated: Americans Cannot Ignore What Their Government Does Abroad*, [on-line magazine] (London: *Guardian Newspapers*, Guardian Unlimited, 13 September 2001, accessed 29 September 2001); available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,551036,00.html>; Internet

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Paul William's, *Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror* (USA: Alpha Books, 2002), 82.

¹⁰ Ibid.

[means] . . . supreme personal sacrifice in order to raise the word of Allah.”¹¹ In other words, a jihad is carried out to glorify Islam through personal sacrifice.

This study has further shown that egoistic tendencies, such as the desire for glorification, pursuit of conservation, pursuit of self-interest, and competition for power among political actors acting out in the global arena, lead to the international state of nature in which political actors, as opposed to lone individuals in the Hobbesian hypothetical state of nature, carry out egoist-based hostilities against each other. This study clearly delineated that these acts of hostility or violence are synonymous with acts in the historical state of nature, represented by conflicts among warring groups. These warring groups evolved into villages, cities, city-states, and eventually nation-states. As the nation-state became the most dominant actor in international relations, powerful nation-state actors began repressing weak nation-state actors as well as groups with no national affiliations or bonds whose lack of national sovereignty and insufficient capabilities forced them into subordinate positions of power.

A Brief Summation of How the Historical State of Nature Motivates al Qaeda to Engage in Political Violence

One of the emerging non-state groups, the Mujahadin, evolved to challenge, and with U.S. military support, eventually defeat a powerful nation-state - the Soviet Union. After the defeat of the Soviet Union, al Qaeda evolved out of a faction of the Mujahadin into a fully developed transnational network and turned its resources of power toward the remaining superpower (i.e., the U.S.) in an attempt to achieve the political goals outlined

¹¹ Rohan Gunaranta, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, a division of penguin group - USA, 2002), 112.

in this study. Al Qaeda, acting out within its dimensions of power, appears to believe that terrorist acts, such as the September 11 attacks, provide the only available mechanism for it to challenge the dominate power of the United States, its allies, and client states (the U.S.-led community of interests). Contained in these assumptions are the apparent causes of the September 11 attacks.

Within the state-of-war conditions that exist in the international state of nature, actors view violence as a means to political ends. Specifically, al Qaeda views American citizens, interests, allies, and client states as prime targets for acts of political violence.¹² This transnational political organization takes the radical view of Islamic theology to its militant conclusions, viewing certain elements of the U.S.-led community of interests as the “Great Satan,” that seeks to destroy (and at a minimum corrupt) the Islamic world.¹³ These realities represent Hobbesian state-of-nature antagonisms and feelings of diffidence placed within the realities of a radical Islamic perspective. By successfully attacking a major political actor, al Qaeda thrust itself onto the international stage as a major player in global affairs and is now perceived by many as the largest threat to American interests since the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is apparent that al Qaeda perceives terrorist acts as an opportunity to challenge a dominant global

¹² "Osama bin Laden's Two Minute Audio Tape Broadcast to Mark the First Anniversary of the U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan," broadcasted on Al Jazeera, Arab satellite television station, Qatar, 6 October 2002, quoted in *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, by Rohan Gunaranta (New York: Berkley Publishing Group/a Division of Penguin Group - USA), 2002.

¹³ Ibid., 119.

competitor that it deems a threat to the interests of the majority of Muslims in the world.¹⁴

Because America has overwhelming military power and the financial resources to buy allies and supporters, al Qaeda uses terrorist acts to decrease the relative power of the U.S. This strategy leads to more political violence in the global arena and a scenario of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The actions on the part of both political actors facilitate political violence, and these actions result in an increase in hostilities in the global political arena. As a reflection of this, the September 11 attacks by al Qaeda exacerbated the state-of-nature circumstances that already existed in the international political arena. Correspondingly, the Bush Administration's counter-terrorism measure, or so-called "War on Terror," has also exacerbated the state-of-nature circumstances in international relations. As noted in this study, the diffidence created by the September 11 attacks were used by the Bush Administration as a mechanism to initiate a foreign policy agenda that called for preemptive military strikes and occupations in the oil-rich, Central Asian region of the world.

The U.S. has the most powerful and destructive military force in the history of the world. Moreover, the U.S. has the most weapons of mass destruction of any nation-state in the world, and the historical record illustrates that it has readily shown a propensity to unleash violence on other political actors. Conceivably, the G. W. Bush Administration has intensified this legacy after September 11 in what appears to be the beginning of a strategy to amplify an American-led global community of interests, consisting of American allies, a set of client states, a global political and economic elite and their

¹⁴ Gunaratna, 122.

managers, and a class/partisan hegemony ruled by conservative Republicans and some moderate Democrats (the “Demo-Rebulicrats”) [sic] and spearheaded and maintained by American military might.¹⁵ As pointed out in this study, many of the policy changes initiated after September 11 are part of a larger political agenda that has been pushed for years by high-ranking members of the G. W. Bush Administration. However, until the terrorist attacks occurred on U.S. soil, these initiatives could not be legitimized in Congress or to the American public in the post-Cold War environment of military cutbacks.¹⁶ Acting in a perfect Hobbesian manner, these actors seized upon the September 11 tragedy and began to implement their agendas.

Al Qaeda and the G. W. Bush Administration as Egoistic Political Actors

Both al Qaeda and the Bush Administration represent political actors who have specific political goals and objectives and who are responding to these goals and objectives based on the following:

1. The political leadership of both regimes is playing out a Hobbesian game of the expression of the stated egoistic tendencies of equality, diffidence, and pursuit of self-interest;
2. The political leadership of both regimes is playing out a Hobbesian game consisting of the competition for political power; and

¹⁵ Ali Moossavi, “9/11's Significance,” [on-line newspaper] (*Detroit: The South End Newspaper*, 10 September 2002, accessed 18 November 2003); available from <http://www.southend.wayne.edu/days/2002/sept/9102002/oped/911/911.html>; Internet.

¹⁶ William C. Banks and Jeffrey D. Straussman, “Defense Contingency Budgeting in the Post-Cold-War World,” *Public Administration Review* 59, no. 2 (1999): 135-136.

3. In the absence of an international sovereign with sufficient political authority, the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international political arena are exacerbated by both al Qaeda and the G. W. Bush administration.

Both political actors--al Qaeda and the G. W. Bush Administration--may view their relevant power positions as being enhanced by this international state of nature. The U.S., as the most powerful military force in the world, benefits from the international state of nature because it has the ability to dominate militarily and these conditions allow the governing leadership to do whatever it deems necessary. Furthermore, because there is a state of nature, American political authority in the U.S. is justified in doing whatever it desires, based on the right or reason of state identified in this study. Similarly, al Qaeda sees the state of nature as a justification to carry out terrorist attacks, since, in a state of nature, actors can do whatever they deem necessary. Additionally, al Qaeda views terrorism as a mechanism to enhance their relative dimensions of power and simultaneously decrease the relative power of the U.S. Furthermore, the noted Hobbesian concept of the equality of desire in the state of nature is congruent with the terrorist strategy of attacking the noncombatant civilian targets of a more dominant actor as a means of somewhat leveling the playing field in global affairs.

Caught in the middle of this Hobbesian state of war are noncombatant civilians on both sides who are trying daily to survive and could generally care less about the power struggles of these actors. These civilian noncombatants are the real victims of this state of war. Both al Qaeda and the Bush Administration engage in the rhetorical use of symbolic language to influence and manipulate these noncombatants into believing that it is the other sided that is responsible for the violence and hostilities. The manipulation of

rhetoric is used by the Bush Administration and al Qaeda as a means to sway public and media opinion so that they can achieve their respective political agendas, which, in both instances, may be detrimental to civilians on either side. In some instances, the behavior of the United States-led community of interests has given credence to the rhetoric of al Qaeda. Conversely, the continued violent actions and rhetoric of al Qaeda has given credence to the propagandized language of the American-led community of interests.

Violent Conflict Resolution in the International State of Nature: Global Social Contract and Shifting American Foreign Policy

If Hobbes's egoistic conceptions of self-interested, survival-oriented behavior carried out in the state-of-war conditions of the international state of nature are correct, then we should expect a continuance of hostilities in the form of war and terrorism. Based on these realities, what are the possibilities for limiting both U.S.-sponsored political violence and Islamic-based terrorism in the future?

One conceptual possibility is the initiation of a type of global social contract similar in structure to the Hobbesian social contract. This contract would conceivably consist of a covenant between a significant number of political actors acting out in international affairs who agree to surrender certain rights to a global political sovereign that is empowered with enough political and military authority to limit the tendency toward violent conflict. In order for an international sovereign to be effective it would have to be relatively objective and be willing to consider the interests of both dominant and subordinate actors, as well as state and non-state actors. Applying the conceptual proposition of an international sovereign to the concerns of this study yields the following possibilities:

1. An objective global sovereign would potentially consider the interests of subordinate actors such as those that represent the varying interests of the international Arab and Islamic community;

2. An objective global sovereign would potentially help facilitate free democratic elections in Arab Muslim nation-states that currently do not have a democratically-based political authority;

3. An objective global sovereign would potentially help provide the mechanisms to create a Palestinian state and limit violent conflict between Israel and Arab Muslims;

4. An objective global sovereign would potentially help provide for a redistribution of wealth in Arab Muslim societies that would limit the recruitment of potential terrorists by radical Islamic elements; and

5. An objective global sovereign would potentially limit the political violence and exploitation carried out by the United States-led community of interests against Muslims.

The accomplishment of these goals could conceivably result in a limitation of political violence such as the September 11 attacks. However, it is inconceivable that an international sovereign with sufficient political and military authority to accomplish the above-stated goals could be established in the foreseeable future. A more realistic approach for limiting political violence such as the September 11 attacks lies with a potential foreign policy shift by the United States government.

Shifting American Foreign Policy: Theory or Possibility?

As outlined in this study, the most dominant power in a global, hierarchical community of interests has the ability to bring divergent interests under its control and to mediate those same interests. The problem is that the dominant actor tends to allow only

those actors which serve its interests into its hierarchical community of interests.

Secondly, actors that are left out of the dominant actor's community of interests may be inclined to challenge the authority of the dominant actor in a competitive game of interest articulation. By placing these conceptions into a Hobbesian framework, it can be shown that control by the dominant actor may be perceived by subordinate actors as being worse than the complete state of nature, absent of any sufficient sovereign authority.

Consequently, some subordinate actors may take actions to bring about, or at a minimum, exacerbate the state of nature in hopes of causing a redistribution of power that benefits them more than the set of circumstances that are dictated by the dominant actor. The extension of these ideas to the realistic conditions of the United States as the dominant actor in the hierarchical community of interests and al Qaeda as a subordinate actor left out of this community of interests, provide a casual explanation for the acts of political violence carried out by al Qaeda.

However, the question is: How can the United States (as the dominant actor in the unipolar community of interests) limit the levels of political violence, including terrorism, in the global political arena? At its foundation, the key to answering this question lies in the fact that the United States is the dominant actor. Within the American-led hierarchy of interests, the United States has some power to require members of its community of interests to take actions that will lend itself to a limiting of the causes of violent conflict. Not surprisingly, some of these potential actions mirror the potential actions noted regarding a conceptual global sovereign. Toward that end, the United States could pressure Israel to allow for the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state and the entry of United Nations troops to ensure the security of this new state.

Secondly, the United States could provide financial assistance to the new Palestinian state that is more in line with the levels of aid given to Israel. Thirdly, the United States could also pressure the sovereign powers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt to initiate more egalitarian political systems. Fourthly, the U.S. could completely withdraw its military personnel from Iraq in favor of a U.N. military contingency that would help ensure impartial democratic elections. Potentially, these actions taken collectively would potentially send a message to the Arab Muslim world that the United States will not support the repression of Arab Muslims by Israel or its Arab allies and client states.

In addition, the United States must tone down its hegemonic empire building and military initiatives throughout the world and lessen its desire to always blatantly take actions that are in its own best interests but in direct opposition to the interests of subordinate nation-states, ethnic and religious groups, and groups with transnational affiliations. By doing this, the United States government sends the message that America, as the world's most powerful political actor, is not to be feared but relied upon to act in a responsible manner. These actions would limit the feelings of diffidence regarding the United States and would limit the mass popular appeal of violent, extremist groups such as al Qaeda, as the extremist rhetoric of these groups will not reflect the true actions of the United States. As long as the United States continues to carry out military attacks and occupations against Muslim societies, these actions will destroy any positive "image of America in the minds of ordinary Muslims."¹⁷ As Professor Bernard Haykel

¹⁷ Bernard Haykel, "Avoiding Bin Laden's Trap," [newspaper on-line] (DAWN, The Internet Edition, *The DAWN Group of Newspapers*, 8 October 2001 accessed 18 December 2001); available from <http://www.dawn.com/2001/10/08/op.htm#2>; Internet.

writes, “the war America is engaged in after the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon is a war for the hearts and minds of average Muslims around the world.”¹⁸

The Applicability of Hobbes’s Theory to a Shift in U. S. Foreign Policy

On the face of it, it appears that such policy changes on the part of the United States as discussed above would be in opposition to the basic arguments of Hobbes that have been outline in this study. However, initiating the above-stated policy shifts reflects an Hobbesian frame of reference for the following reasons:

1. One of the main Hobbesian egoistic tendencies is the pursuit of self-interest, and it is conceivable that, by initiating these policy shifts, the United States government could limit violence in the international political arena, which in turn could limit the threat of terrorist acts being carried out against American civilians and ultimately increase the national security of the United States (which, according to Hobbes is the obligation of the domestic sovereign power);

2. Hobbes posits that, based on the first, Fundamental Law of Nature, every individual should seek peace as far as he or she expects to have peace;

3. Extending this concept to international relations, it can be shown that, like individuals in the individual state of nature, human political actors in the international state of nature should seek peace as far as they expect their nation-state, transnational organization, or political group to have peace; and

4. A further extension of Hobbes’s theory to international affairs yields the conceptualization that it is the first, Fundamental Law of Nature that balances the stated

¹⁸ Ibid.

natural egoist tendencies and provides the basis for limiting hostilities in international relations.

One argument against the United States initiating these policy shifts could be that, even if they were undertaken, the al Qaeda leadership and other radical Islamic actors would still carry out terrorist acts against American interests and citizens. Indeed, this could conceivably be the case. However, a facilitation of the above-stated policy shifts could lead to the following:

1. A decrease in the ability of radical Islamic actors to garner financial support;
 2. A decrease in their mass appeal among the international Muslim community;
- and
3. A decrease in their ability to recruit Muslims into their organizations.

If in fact these proposed policy shifts were effective toward these ends, then this could potentially lead to an erosion of these militant organizations and consequently limit political violence such as the September 11 attacks. If this were the case, then these policy shifts would represent effective counter-terrorism measures.

Summarizing Statements

In conclusion, this study has outlined and illustrated through a logical progression of ideas and deductive reasoning that the applicability of Hobbes's egoistic state of nature extended to global affairs provides an explanatory framework for analyzing the causes of the September 11 attacks. Subsequently, if the egoistic-based state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international state of nature are not reversed, and the current United States-led community of interests continues its hegemonic dominance, and al Qaeda continues to pursue the egoistic glorification of radical Islamic ideology through political

violence, then it is unfortunately likely that terrorist acts such as the September 11 attacks will continue against American citizens, American interests, United States allies, and United States client states.

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